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Summary
This contribution examines the procedural aspects of the enforcement of arbitral 
awards that were set aside in the jurisdiction where they were rendered. It 
focuses on recent cases in the United States and the Netherlands, which adopted 
a different line of reasoning than the approach taken by French judiciary many 
years ago. According to the latter, an arbitral award set aside in the ‘country of 
origin’ may be enforced in France in reliance on national law. Namely, French 
law on enforcement is more favourable than the 1958 New York Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral. The courts in the 
United States and in the Netherlands in recent cases have taken a different 
approach. They examine the judgment setting aside the award and ignore the 
effects of the annulment in certain circumstances. Even though there are some 
common denominators, there are substantial differences between the line of 
reasoning of the courts in the US and the Netherlands. They remain distinct 
although a more recent decision of the Dutch Supreme Court emphasises an 
exceptional nature of such enforcement so that the difference between the two 
approaches may seem somewhat mitigated. However, a closer look reveals 
that substantial discrepancies between the courts in these two jurisdictions 
have remained. The article provides for a critical view on the enforcement of 
annulled arbitral awards in general. In particular, it points to drawbacks of 
variety of unilateral approaches amongst various jurisdictions. Additionally, it 
suggests the development of internationally accepted standards for the sake of 
legal certainty and predictability of arbitration, should the acceptance of the 
enforcement of annulled arbitral appear a majority view amongst academics 
and arbitration practitioners. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ever	since	the	French	Cour de cassation issued	its	ruling	in	the	Norsolor case,1 
the	enforcement	of	annulled	arbitral	awards	has	retained	the	attention	of	arbitration	
specialists	worldwide.	 It	 is	 true	 that	attempts	 to	enforce	an	annulled	arbitral	award	
occur	rather	infrequently.	Yet	in	the	last	30	years	it	has	become	an	inevitable	part	of	
arbitration	practice.	Each	attempt	to	enforce	an	annulled	award	attracts	great	attention	
and	 the	 interest	of	 the	 arbitration	community	and	usually	triggers	a	 heated	debate.	
Regrettably	the	comments	on	the	topic	have	often	been	written	by	the	real	‘actors’	
–	 lawyers	 and	 arbitrators	 involved	 in	 a	 particular	 case.	 Consequently,	 numerous	
publications	predominantly	either	reflect	and	defend	the	 lawyers’	 position	 taken	 in	
a	 concrete	 case	 or	 defend	 the	 arbitrators’	 reasoning	 in	 an	arbitral	award.	Most	
importantly,	some	of	 the	decisions	enforcing	annulled	awards	have	been	driven	by	
political	 rather	 than	 legal	 reasoning	 and	considerations.	Circumstances	 that	 justify	
‘bias	 in	 favour’	 of	 the	 enforcement	 in	 circumstances	 of	 a	 particular	 case,	 may	
hamper	an	objective	legal	analysis.
There	is	no	disagreement	on	the	appropriateness	of	the	enforcement	of	annulled	
arbitral	 awards	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 supplementary	 nature	 of	 Article	 IX	 of	
the	 1961	European	 (Geneva)	Arbitration	 Convention2 to	 the	 provision	 of	Article	
V(1)(e)	 of	 the	 New	York	 Convention.	 However,	 outside	 the	 context	 of	 the	 1961	
European	(Geneva)	Convention,	opinions	in	arbitration	literature	are	strongly	opposed	
1 Pabalk Ticaret Sirketi v. Norsolor S A., Cass. Civ. Ire, 9	 October	1984,	Rev. arb. (1985)	
421,	excerpt	published	in	XI	 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (1986),	 pp.	 484	 et seq. An	
award	 rendered	in	Austria	was	partially	set	 aside	 by	 the	 courts	 at	first	 and	 second	instance,	
as	it	was	based	 on	lex mercatoria. In France,	the	Court	of	Appeal	refused	to	enforce	the	award	
because	of	its	annulment	in	Austria.	This	decision	 was	 reversed	by	 the	 Cour de cassation, 
holding,	 inter a!ia, that	 an	 award	 set	 aside	 abroad	 could	 still	 be	 enforced	 in	 France	by	
relying	on	the	 provision	on	enforcement	in	 French	law	which	is	 more	favourable	 than	 the	
grounds	 listed	 in	Article	 V	 of	 the	New	York	 Convention.	 In	 the	 meantime,	 the	 decisions	
of	 both	 Courts	 in	Austria	 partially	 setting	 aside	 the	 award	 were	 reversed	 at	 last	 instance	
so that the award	was	 not	 set	 aside	 in	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 after	 all.	 Consequently,	the	
French	Cour de cassation did not enforce	an	annulled	arbitral	award,	but	clearly	announced	
its	readiness	 to	do	so.	It	was	for	the	first	time	in Hilmarton that	 the	 French	Court	 enforced	
an	 annulled	 arbitral	 award.	 In	 its	 decision	 of	 19	December	 199 3 the	 Court	 of	Appeal	 of	
Paris	granted	the	exequatur	 in	France	of	the	arbitral	award	set	aside	in	Switzerland,	excerpt	
published	in	 XIX	Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (1994)	 France	 no.	 18,	at	pp.	 655-657.	
In its decision	of	23	March	1994,	the	Cour de Cassasion confirmed	 this	 decision	 and	finally	
enforced	 the	 annulled	award.	 Hilmarton Ltd. v. Omnium de traitement et de valorisation 
(OTV), Cass. Civ., 23	March	1994,	Revue de /'arbitrage (1994)	p.	327,	excerpt	published	 in	
XX	Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (1995)	p. 663 et seq.
2	 Convention	on	International	Commercial	Arbitration,	Geneva,	21	April	1961,	United	Nations,	
Treaty Series (1963-64),	Vol.	484,	p.	364,	NO.	7041	(hereinafter:	1961	European	Convention).
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regarding	the	enforcement	of	an	award	that	has	been	set	aside	in	the	country	where	
it	was	rendered.	 In	some	jurisdictions,	such	as	France	and	other	countries	having	a	
comparable	 legislative	framework,	 the	enforcement	of	annulled	arbitral	awards	has	
become	firmly	established	practice.
However,	it	indeed	appeared	rather	difficult	to	appropriately	accommodate	this	
idea	within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 1958	Convention,	 as	 the	 present	 author	 already	
noted	 in	 an	 earlier	 publication.3 Moreover,	 some	 jurisdictions	 expressly	 reject	 the	
idea	of	enforcing	awards	that	were	set	aside	in	the	country	where	they	were	rendered,4 
with	the	exception	of	enforcement	within	the	context	of	the	supplementary	nature	of	
Article	IX	of	the	1961	European	Convention.
The	present	contribution	analyses	the	approaches	to	enforce	the	arbitral	awards	
annulled	in	the	country	where	rendered	taken	in	the	recent	case	law	in	the	Netherland5 
and	in	the	United	States6 and	examines	the	appropriateness	of	these	approaches.
3	 Lazić,	V.,	‘Enforcement	of	the	Arbitral	Awards	Annulled	in	the	Country	of	Origin’,	Croatian 
Arbitration Yearbook,	Vol.	13	(2006),	pp.	179-204.
4	 See	 e.g.,	 Judgment	 of	 the	 Rostock	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 of	 28	 October	1999,	 OLG Rostock, 
excerpt	 in	XXV	Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (2000)	p.	717.	The	Court	held,	 inter alia,	
that	 ‘[a]n	 award	 is	no	 longer	binding	when	 it	has	been	 set	aside	by	a	competent	court.’	See	
also	the	judgment	of	the	German	Supreme	Court	(Bund esgerichtshof) of	22	February	2001,	No.	
III	ZB	71/99,	excerpt	in	XXIX	Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Germany	 no.	 63.	Although	
the	prevailing	view	in	the	legal	 literature	is	that	awards	annulled	 in	the	country	where	 t h e	y	
w e r	e	rendered	 cannot	be	 enforced	 in	Germany,	some	authors	 have	 expressed	 the	view	that	
there	may	be	exceptional	circumstances	in	which	the	enforcement	 of	 such	 awards	 could	 be	
granted,	such	as	when	the	judgement	 annulling	the	award	does	not	comply	with	requirements	
for	enforcement	in	Germany.	Schlosser,	P	.,	Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung par. 1044 n 
.	 89	 (Stein/Jonas,	21	st.	 ed.,	1994).	However,	such	a	view	does	no	t	find	support	in	Ger	man	
case	law.	I	n	particular,	it	 differs	 from	the	view	expressed	by	the	Rostock	Court	of	Appeal,	
in	its	holding	that	the	decision	 to	set	the	award	aside	‘must	be	recognized	without	examining	
whether	 it	 would	be	 recognizable	according	 to	 the	standards	 for	 the	 recognition	 of	 foreign	
decisions.’	
5	 Decision	 of	 the	 Amsterdam	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 (Gerechtshof Amsterdam)	 of	 28	April	 2009,	
200,005,269,	 Yukos Capital s.a.r.l. (Luxembourg) v. OAO Rosneft (Russian	 Federation),	
Tijdschrift voor Arbitrage (TvA) 2011/1,	p.	15,	excerpt	 in	Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
2009 - Volume XXXIV,	Kluwer	Law	International	(2009),	Netherlands	No.	31	pp.	703	–	714.	
Decision	of	the	Supreme	Court	(Hoge Raad)	of	25	June	2010,	First	Chamber,	09/02565	EE,Y 
OAO Rosneft (Russian Federation) v. Yukos Capital s.a.r.l. (Luxembourg),	original	decision	in	
Case	No.	LJN:	BM1679	available	at	http://www.rechtspraak.nl,	excerpt	in	English	in	Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration 2010 - Volume XXXV,	Kluwer	Law	International	(2010)	Netherlands	
No.	34,	pp.	423	–	426.	Decision	of	Amsterdam	District	CDourt	 (Rechtbank	Amsterdam)	of	
17	 November	 2011,	 ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2011:BV5646	 (Maksimov v Novolipetsy Steel Mill 
(NLMK));	 Hof	Amsterdam,	 18-9-2012,	 ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BY5010.	 Hof	Amsterdam,	
15-4-2014,	ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:6020.	HR,	24-11-2017,	ECLI:NL:HR:2017:2992.
6	 Corporación	Mexicana	de	Matenimiento	Integral,	S.	de	R.L.	de	C.V.	v.	Pemex-Exploración	y	
Producción,	No.	10	Civ.	206	(AKH),	2013	WL	4517225	(S.D.N.Y.	Aug.	23,	2013).
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2. ENFORCEMENT UNDER NATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW
Abundant	case	law	in	France	and	occasional	enforcement	in	other	jurisdictions7 
present	 examples	 of	 enforcing	 the	 annulled	 award	 under	 national	 arbitration	 law.	
As	 an	 annulment	 in	 the	 country	of	 origin	 is	 not	 amongst	 the	 reasons	 for	 refusing	
enforcement	according	to	the	relevant	provision	of	French	law	in	Article	1520	of	the	
French	New	Code	of	Civil	Procedure,8 a	party	may	request	enforcement	by	relying	
on	 this	 provision	 instead	 of	Article	V(1)	 of	 the	New	York	 Convention.	The	 latter	
lists	the	reasons	for	refusing	enforcement	which	may	be	invoked	by	a	party	resisting	
the	enforcement.	The	fact	 that	an	award	has	been	set	aside	 in	 the	country	where	 it	
was	rendered	or	under	the	law	of	which	it	was	rendered	presents	a	ground	on	which	
enforcement	can	be	refused	in	Article	V(1)(e)	of	the	Convention.	A	party	may	rely	
on	a	national	law	providing	for	a	more	favourable	enforcement	regime	by	invoking	
Article	VII(1)	of	the	Convention.
The	formula	established	in	Hilmarton judgment9 has	been	repeatedly	maintained	
in	subsequent	decisions	enforcing	annulled	arbitral	awards	in	France.10 Consequently,	
Article	 V of	 the	 1958	 New	 York	 Convention	has	 virtually	no	 relevance	 there.11 
More	 importantly,	 the	French	courts	would	enforce	arbitral	awards	annulled	in	an	
EU	 Member	 State	 for	 violating	mandatory	 rules	 of	 Community	 law,	 such	 as	 EC	
competition	law.	The	circumstances	surrounding	SNF v. Cytec12 illustrate	this	potential	
7	 See	e.g.,	the	enforcement	in	Belgium	of	an	award	set	aside	in	Algeria	in	Sonatrach v. Ford, 
Bacon and Davis Inc., Brussels	 Court	 of	First	 Instance,	 6	December	1988,	 excerpt	 in	XV	
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (1990)	 p.	 370	 et seq. The	 1958	 New	 York	 Convention	
was	 held	 to	be	inapplicable,	since	Algeria	was	not	a party	to	it.	Accordingly,	the	enforcement	
was	based	on	the	domestic	law	on	the	enforcement	of	foreign awards.	 The	 court	 concluded	
that	no	reasons	 for	refusing	the	enforcement	 could	have	been	 found	under	Belgian law	and	
declared	 the	award	enforceable.
8	 As	 revised	 in	 2012.	 Under	 the	 previous	 legislation	 when	 Norsolor and Hilmarton were	
decided	 it	 was	 a	provision	under	Article	1502.
9	 The	approach	followed	by	the	French	Cour de cassation can	be	summarised	as	follows:	The	
award	 rendered abroad	 is	an	international	award	which	does	not	have	to	be	incorporated	in	
the legal order of the country	where	it	had	been	rendered.	The	relevant	provision	 of	French	
statutory	 law	on	arbitration	 in	Article	 1502	of the	New	 Code	 of	Civil	 Procedure	does	 not	
contain	 a	ground	 for	refusing	 enforcement	 as	 expressed	in	Article	V(l)(e)	of	the	 1958	New	
York	 Convention.	 Accordingly,	 its	 enforcement	scheme	 is	 more	favourable	 than	 the	1958	
New	York	 Convention.	Such	a	more	 favourable	 enforcement	 regime	 of	 domestic	 law	 can	
be	relied	upon	on the	basis	 of	the	 ‘	more	 favourable	right’	provision	o f	Article	VII(l)	 of	the	
1958	New	York	Convention.
10	 See	 e.g.,	Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt , Cour d 'appel de Paris, 14 
January	1997, Mealey's International Arbitration Report, 12	(1997)	 4,	p.	B-	l;	Société PT 
Putrabali Adyamulia c/ SA Rena Holdings, Cour de cassation, 1ere civ 29 juin 2007,	Bulletin	
2007,	 I,	 N°	 250;	 Paris	 Court	 of	Appeal,	 Bechtel	 v.	 DAC,	 29	 September	 2005,	 Juris-Data	
n°2005-287354,	Rev. arb. 2006.695,	 commentary	by	H.	Muir	Watt;	 Paris	Court	of	Appeal,	
SNF v. Cytec,	23	March	2006,	Rev.	arb.	2007.	100,	commentary	by	S.	Bollée.
11	 See	e.g.,	Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt , Cour d 'appel de Paris, 14 
January1997,	Mealey's International Arbitration Report, 12	(1997)	4,	p.	B-	l	 (stating,	 inter 
alia, that	the	application	 of	Art.	V	‘must	then	be	set	aside’,	at	p.	B-2).
12	 SNF	v.	Cytec,	Paris	Court	of	Appeal,	23	March	2006	and	the	French	Supreme	Court	of	4	June	
V. LAZIĆ-SMOLJANIĆ, Enforcing annulled arbitral awards: a comparison of...
Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, vol. 39, br. 1, 215-240 (2018) 219
risk.	As	consequences	of	enforcing	such	arbitral	awards	may	have	a	direct	influence	
on	the	internal	market,	it	would	be	desirable	that	certain	aspects	of	arbitration	be	put	
on	the	agenda	of	the	EU	legislators.	This	is	particularly	so	considering	the	importance	
attached	 to	 enhancing	 the	use	of	out-of-court	dispute	 resolution	within	 the	general	
objective	of	improving	access	to	justice	in	the	European	Union.
3. ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION 
– THE UNITED STATES
Obviously	the	‘French	approach’	can	be	followed	in	other	jurisdictions	which	
have	a	comparable	legal	framework,	i.e.,	as	long	as	a	domestic	regime	on	enforcement	
does	 not	 contain	 the	 annulment	 of	 an	 award	 in	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 amongst	 the	
reasons	for	rejecting	the	enforcement.	However,	an	analysis	of	the	relevant	case	law,	
especially	the	United	States’	decision	in	Chromalloy,13 illustrates	that	the	enforcement	
of	an	annulled	award	may	appear	to	be	 difficult	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 1958	
New	 York	 Convention	 which	 applies	 when	there	is	no	more	favourable	domestic	
enforcement	 regime.	 This	 will	 be	 when	 a	 domestic	 enforcement	 scheme	 contains	
identical	grounds	as	Article	V	of	the	1958	New	York	Convention	or	in	any	case	when	
it	does	provide	that	the	annulment	of	the	award	in	the	country	of	origin	is	a	reason	to	
refuse	the	enforcement.
In the Chromalloy judgment	 Judge	J.L.	 Green	of	 the	 United	States	 District	
Court,	District	of	Columbia,	granted	the	enforcement	of	the	award	notwithstanding	
the annulment	in	Egypt	where	 it	had	been	 rendered.	 This	decision	 was	extensively	
discussed	 in the literature14 and	 therefore	 will	 not	 be	 addressed	 in	 detail	 in	 the	
present contribution.	Yet	this	decision	is	a	perfect	illustration	that	the	French	approach	
in	addressing	the	interplay	 between	Articles	V	and	VII	 obviously	cannot	be	easily	
‘exported’	when	there	is	no	comparable	enforcement	regime	in	domestic	law	as	is	the	case	
in	the	United	States.
In	particular,	there	is	no	provision	in	the	United	States’	 Federal	Arbitration	Act	
corresponding	to	the	relevant	provision	 in	the	French	New	Code	of	Civil	Procedure,	
which	would	 offer	 a	 more	 favourable	 domestic	 enforcement	 regime	 for	 foreign	
awards.	 In	 other	 words,	 there	 is	 no	 provision	 relating	 to	 the	 enforcement	 of	
2008,	Clunet	2008,	1107;	Court	of	Appeal	of	Brussels	of	22	June	2009.
13 Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F Supp. 907 ( D.D.C. 1996).
14	 E.g.,	 Paulsson,	 J.,	'Rediscovering	the	NY	Convention:	Further	Reflections	on	 Chromalloy’,	
Mealey's International Arbitration Report, 17	 (April	 1997)	 4,	 p.	 34;	 Rivkin,	 D.	V.,	 ‘The	
Enforcement	of	Awards	Nullified	in	 the	Country	 of	Origin	 :	The	American	Experience’,	 in	
:	van	 den	Berg,	A.J.,	 (ed.),	Improving the Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards, 
ICCA	Congress	 series	No.	9	(1999)	 528,	534	et seq.; Sampliner,	G	.	H	.	,	‘Enforcement	of	
Nullified	Foreign	Arbitral	Awards	 -	Chromalloy Revisited’,	14	J. Int. (1997),	 125	at	p.	132;	
Schwartz,	 E.,	 'A	Comment	 on	 Chromalloy - Hilmarton	 a	l'americaine'14	 J. Int' l Arb. 2 
(1997)	125,	at	p.	132;	Gharavi,	H.G.,	'Chromalloy:	Another	view'	 12	Mealey's Int. Arb. Rep. 
5 (Mav	1997),	21	at	p.	22-23;	Van	den	Berg,	A.J.,	9	JCC Bulletin (Nov.	1998)	pp.	15	et seq.; 
Lazić,	V.,	‘Enforcement	of	the	Arbitral	Awards	Annulled	in	the	Country	of	Origin’,	Croatian 
Arbitration Yearbook,	Vol.	13	(2006),	pp.	179-204.
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foreign	 awards	 in	 the	 Federal	Arbitration	Act	 outside	 the	 treaties.	Thus,	the	 1958	
New	York	 Convention	 is	 implemented	 in	Chapter	2	and	the	 1975	 Inter-American	
Convention	on	 International	Commercial	Arbitration	(hereinafter:	the	1975	Panama	
Convention)	 in	Chapter	3.	There	is	no	provision	on	the	enforcement	of	foreign	arbitral	
awards	in	Chapter	 1,	which	applies	 to	arbitration	taking	place	in	the	United	States.	
Yet,	the	Chromalloy judgment	did	rely	on	Chapter	1,	thereby	erroneously	referring	to	
Section	 10	of	the	Federal	Arbitration	Act.	This	provision	relates	to	the	grounds	for	
the	‘vacation’	(or	the	setting	aside)	of	awards	rendered	 in	the	United	States	and	does	
not	 deal	with	the	enforcement	of	 foreign	awards.	Subsequent	decisions	by	various	
courts	 in	the	United	States	 rejected,	 either	 expressly	 or	 impliedly,	 t	h	e	application	
of	Chapter	 1	on	the	enforcement	 of	foreign	arbitral	awards.15 Also	the	opinion	that	
Chapter	 1	cannot	be	relied	upon	 for	the	enforcement	of	foreign	arbitral	awards	has	
been	a	majority	view	expressed	in	legal	literature.16
It	 is	 true	 that	 the	 relevant	provision	of	Article	1520	of	 the	French	arbitration	
statutory	 law	 also	 contains	 reasons	 for	 setting	 aside.	 However,	 these	 grounds	 are	
expressly	 applicable	 to	 the	 enforcement	 of	 foreign	 arbitral	 awards	 as	 provided	 in	
Article	 1525.	There	 is	 no	 such	 reference	 in	 the	United	 States’	 Federal	Arbitration	
Act	which	would	justify	the	application	of	the	grounds	for	‘vacating’	awards	at	the	
enforcement	 stage.	As	 the	 legal	 reasoning	 in	Chromalloy received	 in	 that	 respect	
rather	 limited	 acceptance	 in	 subsequent	 decisions,	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 state	 that	
Chromalloy has	thereby	been	pushed	into	‘a	narrow	corner	of	New	York	Convention	
jurisprudence’.
17 Regrettably,	though,	neither	of	the	two	judgments	addressed	infra 
15 E.g., Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R " Us, Inc., 126	F.3d	(2d	Cir.	1997),	excerpt	in	
XXIII	Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, pp.	 1058-1067	 (US	no.	261).	Baker Marine, 191 
F.3d	(2d	Cir.	1999),	excerpt	in	XXIV	Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (1999)	(US	no.	288)	
p. 909 et seq; Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica, S.p.A., F.Supp.2d (S.D.N.Y. 1999), excerpt in 
XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (2000) (US no. 325) p. 1042 et seq.
16	 See	e.g., Schwartz,	 E.,	 'A	Comment	 on	Chromalloy - Hilmarton	 a	l'americaine',	 14	J. Int' l 
Arb. 2 (1997)	125,	at	p.	 132;	Gharavi,	H.G.,	 'Chromalloy:	Another	 view',	 12	Mealey's Int. 
Arb. Rep. 5	(Mav	1997),	21	at p.	22-23;	Van	den	Berg,	A.J.,	9	JCC Bulletin (Nov.	1998),	15,	
at	p.	17-19.	Even	those	authors	generally	favouring	the	 enforcement	of	annulled	awards	h a v e 
attempted	to	avoid	the	discussion	on	the	correct	application	of	American	law	in	 this	case,	 see	
e.g.,	 Paulsson,	J.,	 'Rediscovering	the	NY	Convention:	Further	 Reflections	 on	 Chromalloy,	
Mealey's International Arbitration Report, 17	(April	 1997)	4,	p.	 34,	n.	35	 (‘Assuming	 that	
Judge	Green	 correctly	 applied	 U.S.	 domestic	 law,	as	to	which	 I	express	 no	 opinion since	
I	 am	 examining	 universal	 ramifications	 of	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 rather	 than	 U.	S.	
legislation	 as	such’).	In	general,	only	a	few	authors	 have	argued	that	Chapter	 1	of	the	Unite	
States’	Federal	Arbitration	Act	can	be	used	as	an	alternative	basis	for	enforcing	foreign	awards.	
See	e.g., Rivkin,	D.	V.,	 ´The	Enforcement	of	Awards	Nullified	 in	the	Country	of	Origin:	The	
American	Experience´,	in:	van	den	Berg,	A.J.,	(ed.),	Improving the Efficiency of Arbitration 
Agreements and Awards, ICCA	Congress	 series,	No.	9	(1999)	528,	534	et seq.; Sampliner,	
G	.	H	.,‘	Enforcement	of	Nullified	 Foreign	 Arbitral	 Awards	 -	Chromalloy Revisited ,´	 14	J. 
Int. Arb. 3	(1997),	125	at	p.	132.	However,	this	view	has	found	no	support	in	subsequent	US	
case	law.
17	 Feinacht,	F.,	 ‘Enforcement	of	Annulled	Foreign	Arbitral	Awards	in	Germany’,	19	Journal of 
International Arbitration 4	(2002),	313	et	seq.,	at	p.	314,	n.	6	referring	to	Marc	J.	Goldstein,	34	
Int' l Law 519	(2000).
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have	expressly	distanced	themselves	from	the	Chromalloy judgment.
3.1. The TermoRio and Pemex judgments
Obviously,	 the	 enforcement	 of	 an	 annulled	 award	 could	 not	 succeed	 in	 the	
United	States	by	reference	to	a	more	favourable	regime	under	domestic	law.	Yet	the	
United	States’	courts	have	found	a	way	to	enforce	an	annulled	arbitral	award	through	
the	 enforcement	 framework	 under	 two	 international	 treaties	 -	 the	 1958	New	York	
Convention	and	the	1975	Panama	Convention.	The	TermoRio and Pemex judgments	
have	introduced	a	new	aspect	when	deciding	on	the	enforcement	 of	 annulled	 arbitral	
awards.	In	 particular,	 it	 involves	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	foreign	judgment	setting	
aside	the	award	and	whose	enforcement	has	been	requested	in	the	United	States.	As	
such	they	present	a	relevant	source	on	the	interpretation	of	Article	V	(1)	(e)	of	 the	
New	York	Convention,	even	 though	 the	Pemex judgment	 relates	 to	 the	application	
of	the	Panama	Convention.	Namely	both	Conventions	contain	comparable	reasons	to	
refuse	the	enforcement	of	arbitral	awards.	Article	V	of	the	1975	Panama	Convention	
is	substantively	identical	to	Article	V	of	the	1958	New	York	Convention.	Thus,	both	
Conventions	 provide	 that	 an	 annulment	 in	 the	 country	 where	 an	 award	 has	 been	
rendered	presents	a	reason	to	refuse	its	enforcement.
As	 already	 announced	 in	 Baker Marine,	 the	 Columbia	 District	 Court	 in	
TermoRio18	 noted	 that	 there	 might	 be	 circumstances	 where	 an	 arbitration	 award	
should	be	enforced	notwithstanding	a	nullification	in	the	country	where	the	award	had	
been	rendered.	The	Court	had	to	decide	on	a	request	for	 the	enforcement	of	an	 ICC	
arbitral	 award	 that	 had	 been	 set	aside	 by	 the	 competent	courts	 in	 Colombia.	In	
the	 arbitral	 proceedings	 TermoRio	 et	 al.	prevailed	and	the	state-owned	Colombian	
agency	Electranta	had	to	pay	damages	due	to	a	breach	of	obligations	under	the	contract.	
The	competent	Colombian	court	Consejo de Estado ultimately	 set	the	 award	aside.	
The	 ground	 on	which	 it	 based	 its	 decision	was	 that	 the	 arbitration	 had	 not	 been	
conducted	in	accordance	with	Colombian	law,	which	did	not	permit	the	use	of	the	ICC	
rules	at	the	time	when	the	arbitral	proceedings	were	held.
TermoRio	 and	 a	 US	 shareholder	 LeaseCo	 initiated	 enforcement	 proceedings	
before	 the	 United	 States	 District	 Court	 for	 the	 District	 of	 Columbia.	 The	 Court	
dismissed	the	request	for	enforcement	because	the	arbitral	award	had	been	set	aside	
by	the	Colombian	courts	and	alternatively	on	the	ground	of	forum	non	conveniens.	
TermoRio	appealed	and	argued	that	 the	Colombian	courts’	annulment	of	the	award	
amounted	to	a	denial	of	fair	process.	It	further	argued	that	the	US	courts	had	discretion	
under	the	1958	New	York	Convention	to	enforce	an	award	despite	its	annulment	in	
the	 country	of	origin	 so	 that	 they	could	 refuse	 to	give	 effect	 to	an	annulment	 that	
violates	 the	 US’	 own	 fundamental	 principles.	 By	maintaining	 that	 the	 Colombian	
courts’	 decision	was	 contrary	 to	 both	Colombian	 and	 international	 law,	TermoRio	
18	 TermoRio	S.A.E.S.P.(Colombia),	LeaseCo	Group	and	others	v.	Electranta	S.P.	(Columbia)	et	
al.,	487	F.	3d	928	(D.C.	Cir.	2007)	excerpt	in	XXXI	Yearbook	Commercial	Arbitration	(2006)	
at	pp.	1457-1461	(US	no.	575).
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suggested	that	the	enforcement	of	the	annulled	award	should	have	been	granted.19
The	 United	 States	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 for	 the	 District	 of	 Columbia	 Circuit20 
denied	the	application	for	an	appeal	and	affirmed	the	decision	of	the	District	Court	
thereby	refusing	to	enforce	the	award.	It	held,	inter alia,	that	Colombian	courts	did	
have	 primary	 jurisdiction	 for	 setting	 aside	 proceedings	 as	 the	 arbitral	 award	 had	
been	rendered	in	that	country.	In	reference	to	Article	V(1)(e)	of	the	1958	New	York	
Convention,	 the	Court	maintained	 that	a	country	of	the	enforcement	 (‘a	 secondary	
Contracting	 State’)	 ‘normally	may	not	 enforce	 an	 arbitration	 award	 that	 has	 been	
lawfully	set	aside	by	a	“competent	authority”	in	the	primary	Contracting	State.’21 It 
concurred	with	the	appellees	that	Consejo de Estado was	undisputedly	a	‘competent	
authority’	 in	 the	primary	Contracting	State	and	 that	 there	was	no	evidence	that	 the	
proceedings	 had	 been	 tainted	 or	 the	 judgment	 ‘other	 than	 authentic’.22 The	 Court	
concluded	 that	 an	 enforcement	 granted	 despite	 a	 lawful	 annulment	 in	 the	 country	
of	 primary	 jurisdiction	 ‘would	 seriously	 undermine	 a	 principal	 precept	 of	 the	
New	 York	 Convention:	 an	 arbitral	 award	 does	 not	 exist	 to	 be	 enforced	 in	 other	
Contracting	States	if	it	has	been	lawfully	“set	aside”	by	a	competent	authority	in	the	
State	in	which	the	award	was	made.’23
When	 addressing	 the	 allegation	 that	 Colombian	 courts’	 decisions	 were	
contrary	 to	both	Colombian	and	international	law,	the	TermoRio Court	observed	that	
‘there	 is	 a	 narrow	public	 policy	 gloss	on	Article	 V(1)(e)	 of	 the	Convention’	 and	
that	a	 foreign	annulment	judgment	could	be	unenforceable	as	being	against	public	
policy	 ‘to	 the	extent	 that	 it	would	be	 repugnant	 to	 fundamental	notions	of	what	 is	
decent	and	just	in	the	United	States’.
24 The	Court	concluded	 that	in	the	 case	 at	hand	
there	 was	no	evidence	 that	the	 annulment	judgment	‘violated	any	basic	notions	of	
justice	to	which	we	subscribe’25 and	accordingly	there	was	no	reason	why	it	should	
not	be	given	effect	in	the	United	States.	The	Court	eventually	refused	to	enforce	the	
annulled	arbitral	award,	interpreting	Article	V(1)(e)	of	the	1958	New	York	Convention	
in	a	rather	unique	manner.	In	particular,	it	introduced	the	‘violation	of	basic	notions	
of	justice’	test	for	foreign	annulment	judgments.	However,	it	emphasised	thereby	that	
19	 From	 the	 summary	of	 facts	 in	 the	 excerpt	TermoRio S.A.E.S.P.(Colombia), LeaseCo Group 
and others v. Electranta S.P. (Columbia) et al.,	 United	 States	 Court	 of	 Appeals,	 District	
of	 Columbia	 Circuit,	 06-7058,	 25	 May	 2007,	 excerpt	 in	 XXXIII	 Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration (2008),	 pp.	 955	 it	 follows	 that	 Termo	 Rio	curiously	 enough	 proposed	 that	 the	
Court	was	 to	 rely	on	 the	 public	 policy	 exception	of	Article	V(2)(b)	 of	 the	1958	New	York	
Convention	when	 granting	 the	 enforcement	of	 the	 annulled	 award.	This	would	 be	 a	 rather	
odd	proposition	considering	that	the	public	policy	exception	in	Article	V(2)	presents	a	reason	
for	refusing	the	enforcement	of	an	award	and	has	nothing	to	do	with	an	annulment	judgment.	
However,	no	such	proposition	seems	to	follow	from	the	judgment	itself.
20 TermoRio S.A.E.S.P.(Colombia), LeaseCo Group and others v. Electranta S.P. (Columbia) 
et al. ,	United	States	Court	of	Appeals,	District	of	Columbia	Circuit,	06-7058,	25	May	2007,	
excerpt	 in	XXXIII	Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (2008),	pp.	955-969.
21 Id.,	p.	961,	para.	[9]	of	the	excerpt.
22 Id.
23 Id.,	p.	962,	para.	[10]	of	the	excerpt.
24 Id.,	p.	965,	para.	[18]	of	the	excerpt.
25 Id.
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the	concept	of	public	policy	should	be	narrowly	construed.	In	that	context,	the	Court	
held	that	since	Article	V(1)(e)	‘contains	no	exception	for	public	policy,	it	would	be	
strange	indeed	to	recognize	such	an	implicit	limitation	in	Art.	V(1)(e)	that	is	broader	
than	the	express	limitation	in	Art.	V(2)(b).’26
Unfortunately,	 the	Court	 in	TermoRio did	 not	 expressly	 distance	 itself	 from	
Chromalloy even	though	it	did	not	follow	the	line	of	reasoning	employed	therein.	Yet	
it	cited	a	part	of	the	reasoning	therein	in	that	‘a	decision	by	this	Court	to	recognize	
the	decision	of	the	Egyptian	Court	would	violate	clear	U.S.	public	policy	in	favor	of	
binding	arbitration	clauses.
The	 ‘violation	 of	 basic	 notions	 of	 justice’	 test	 suggested	 in	 TermoRio was	
subsequently	applied	in	the	Pemex judgment	of	the	Southern	District	Court	of	New	
York.27	In	 this	 decision	 Judge	Alvin	K.	Hellerstein	 ordered	 the	 enforcement	 in	 the	
United	States	of	an	arbitral	award	that	had	been	set	aside	by	a	Mexican	court.	This	
is	the	first	judgment	after	the	Chromalloy case	where	an	annulled	foreign	award	was	
enforced	 in	 the	United	States,	 even	 though	 for	 substantially	different	 reasons.	The	
District	 Court	 in	Pemex did	 not	 expressly	 distance	 itself	 from	 the	 analysis	 in	 the	
Chromalloy judgment	on	the	application	of	Article	VII(1),	as	there	is	no	such	provision	
in	 the	 Panama	Convention.	 Instead	 the	 line	 of	 reasoning	 adopted	 in	 the	Termorio 
judgment	was	followed	in	Pemex,	even	though	in	the	latter	case	the	governing	treaty	
was	 not	 the	New	York	Convention,	 but	 the	 1975	Panama	Convention.	As	already	
mentioned,	 for	 the	 issue	 at	 hand	 the	1958	 New	 York	 Convention	 and	 the	1975	
Panama	Convention	are	substantially	identical.
The	 decision	 of	 the	 Southern	District	 Court	 of	 New	York	was	 confirmed	 in	
the	 recent	 judgment	 of	 the	 Court	 of	Appeals	 for	 the	 Second	 Circuit.28 The	 latter	
affirmed	the	holding	of	the	District	Court	judge	that	a	judgment	was	unenforceable	
as	against	public	policy	to	the	extent	that	it	was	‘repugnant	to	fundamental	notions	
of	what	is	decent	and	just	in	the	State	where	enforcement	is	sought.’29 Both	Courts	
maintained	that	there	was	discretion	in	enforcing	annulled	foreign	arbitral	awards	for	
the	 recognising	court,	but	only	to	vindicate	‘fundamental	notions	of	what	is	decent	
and	just	in	the	United	States’.30
In	this	context,	proper	attention	should	be	paid	to	the	rather	peculiar	circumstances	
of	the	case	at	hand.	First	of	all,	when	Commisa,	a	Mexican	subsidiary	of	 the	U.S.	
corporation	KBR	and	a	claimant	 in	arbitral	proceedings,	 initiated	arbitration	at	 the	
end	 of	2004	 the	dispute	with	Pemex,	 a	 subsidiary	of	 the	Mexican	 state-owned	oil	
corporation,	was	´arbitrable´	in	the	sense	that	Pemex	was	authorised	to	arbitrate,	did	
agree	to	arbitrate	and	actively	participated	in	the	arbitration	proceedings.	Only	at	a	later	
stage	did	the	dispute	become	‘non-arbitrable’	by	proclaiming	a	retroactive	application	
of	 the	 relevant	 Mexican	 laws,	 whereas	 the	 capacity	 of	 Pemex	 to	 arbitrate	 was	
26 Id.,	p.	965,	para.	[17]	of	the	excerpt.
27 Corporación Mexicana de Matenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración y 
Producción,	No.	10	Civ.	206	(AKH),	2013	WL	4517225	(S.D.N.Y.	Aug.	23,	2013).
28 Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral v. Pemex-Exploración Y Producción,	No.	
13-4022	(2d	Cir.	Aug.	2,	2016).
29 Id., p. 29.
30 Id., p.	29-30.
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established	under	prior	law.31 Such	retroactive	application	rendered	the	dispute	‘non-
arbitrable’	and	consequently	the	award	was	susceptible	 to	annulment.	Accordingly,	
the	crucial	 issue	before	the	US	Courts	was	a	retroactive	application	of	laws	by	the	
Mexican	courts	and	the	unfairness	associated	therewith.	More	importantly,	it	seems	
that	a	retroactive	application	of	the	relevant	statute	of	limitations	would	render	any	
claim	inadmissible	 in	 any	 forum,32 i.e.,	 even	 if	 the	 claim	 would	 subsequently	 be	
filed	 before	 the	Mexican	 courts	 as	 it	 would	 be	 time-barred.33 Such	 a	 retroactive	
application	of	 the	 relevant	laws	by	the	Mexican	courts	when	setting	aside	the	arbitral	
award	obviously	violates	basic	notions	of	morality	and	justice	accepted	not	only	in	
the	United	States	but	in	many	jurisdictions	worldwide.	As	such	it	is	not	surprising	that	
it	had	to	be	given	no	effect.	In	other	words,	it	would	be	very	difficult	indeed	to	find	a	
way	to	decide	differently	in	the	circumstances	of	the	case	at	hand.
It	is	therefore	not	surprising	that	the	decision	of	the	Southern	District	Court	of	
New	York	was	confirmed	in	judgment	of	the	Court	of	Appeals	for	the	Second	Circuit.	
The	latter	Court	made	clear	that	the	rather	peculiar	facts	in	the	case	at	hand	qualified	
it as an ´extraordinary´	 case	 in	 which	 the	 award	 could	 be	 enforced	 despite	 the	
annulment	 in	 the	country	where	it	had	been	rendered.	In	other	words,	it	found	that	the	
facts	in	the	present	case	complied	with	 the	criterion	of	´extraordinary	circumstances´ 
where	 a	 deference	 would	 be	´repugnant	to	fundamental	notions	of	what	is	decent	
and	 just´.	 The	Court	 indicates	 which	 considerations	 are	 decisive	 to	 impinge	 upon	
United	States’	public	policy	 principles:	 the	vindication	of	contractual	undertakings	
and	the	waiver	of	sovereign	immunity,	the	repugnancy	of	retroactive	legislation	that	
disrupts	contractual	expectations,	the	need	to	ensure	that	legal	claims	find	a	forum	and	
prohibition	against	government	expropriation	without	compensation.34
It	may	be	 concluded	 that	 extraordinary	 circumstances	would	 be	 required	 for	
a	court	in	the	United	States	to	qualify	a	foreign	annulment	judgment	as	´repugnant´ 
to	United	States’	public	policy	considerations	that	would	justify	the	enforcement	of	
the	award	in	the	United	States	despite	the	annulment	abroad.	The	Court	of	Appeals	
refers	to	the	‘rare	circumstances	of	this	case’35 and	suggests	that	enforcing	an	annulled	
award	may	be	justified	only	in	exceptional	cases	where	‘the	nullification	of	the	award	
offends	basic	standards	of	 justice	 in	 the	United	States’.	Most	 importantly,	 it	warns	
that	‘[a]ny	court	should	act	with	trepidation	and	reluctance	in	enforcing	an	arbitral	
award	that	had	been	declared	nullity	by	the	courts	having	jurisdiction	over	the	forum	
in	which	the	award	was	rendered.’36 Considering	the	exceptional	nature	of	the	facts	in	
the Pemex case,	it	does	not	seem	likely	that	the	reasoning	in	this	decision	will	have	
31 Id.,	p.	34.
32 Id.,	p.	36.
33	 The	change	in	the	Mexican	law	subjected	Commisa’s	claims	to	the	45-day	statute	of	limitations.	
Besides,	the	claim	was	declared	as	barred	by	res judiciata on an amparo action	instituted	in	the	
Mexican	District	Court,	an	issue	which	the	arbitral	tribunal	presumably	could	not	adjudicate.	
Id.,	p.	37.
34 Id.,	p.	30.
35 Id.,	p.	40.
36 Id.,	p.	40.
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substantial	relevance	and	acceptance	in	future	cases.37
4. ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION 
- THE NETHERLANDS
4.1. The Yukos judgments38
As	 for	 the	 enforcement	 of	 an	 annulled	 award	 outside	 the	 1958	 New	 York	
Convention,	in	the	view	of	the	present	author,	as	expressed	earlier,39 this	could	only	
be	possible	if	the	law	of	the	enforcing	 state	 does	 not	 provide	 for	 the	 annulment	
of	 awards	 as	a	 reason	 to	refuse	 the	recognition	or	enforcement	of	a	foreign	arbitral	
award,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 under	 French	 law.	 In	 the	 latter	 case,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	Article	
VII(I)	of	the	New	York	Convention	a	party	may	rely	on	a	more	favourable	national	
law	for	 the	enforcement	of	 foreign	arbitral	 awards.	 In	contrast,	Article	1076(1)(A)
(e)	of	the	Dutch	Arbitration	Act	provides	for	the	same	reason	to	refuse	recognition	
or	 enforcement	 as	Article	V(1)(e)	 of	 the	 Convention.	 Therefore,	 it	 was	 not	 to	 be	
expected	that	the	courts	in	the	Netherlands	could	follow	the	‘French	approach.’	The	
latter	assumes	 a	 more	 favourable	 regime	 for	 the	 enforcement	 of	 foreign	 arbitral	
awards	 than	 the	New	York	Convention	which	does	not	 provide	 for	 this	 particular	
reason	to	refuse	enforcement.40 Considering	that	the	Dutch	law	on	the	enforcement	of	
foreign	arbitral	awards	does	 contain	 this	 ground	 to	 refuse	 enforcement,	 the	 French	
approach	 cannot	 be	 ‘imported’	into	the	Netherlands.
Yet	the	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	in	its	decision	of	28	April	200941 applied 
37	 It	is	true	that	there	are	circumstances	in	which	retroactive	application	of	law	would	implicate	a	
lack	of	the	right	to	arbitrate.	See	e.g.,	ATA	Construction	v.	Jordan	ATA	Construction,	Industrial	
and	 Trading	 Company	 v.	 Hashemite	 Kingdom	 of	 Jordan	 (ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/08/2).	
However,	this	in	itself	does	not	necessarily	bar	the	substantive	claim	itself	or	the	possibility	to	
institute	the	claim	in	other,	non-arbitral	forum.
38	 This	part	of	the	contribution	is	based	on	the	research	presented	in	the	earlier	publications	Lazić,	
V.	‘The	Interpretation	and	Application	of	the	New	York	Convention	in	the	Netherlands”,	in:	G.A.	
Bermann	(ed.),	Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards	-	The Interpretation 
and Application of the New York Convention by National Courts,, Ius	Comparatum	–	Global	
Studies	in	Comparative	Law,	Springer	Publishing	(2017)	pp.	689-731	and	‘‘Enforcing	Annulled	
Arbitral	Awards	in	The	Netherlands’,	in:	H.	Koster/F.	Pennings/C.	Rusu	(eds),	Essays	on	Private	
&	Business	Law:	A	Tribute	to	Professor	Adriaan	Dprresteijn,)	Eleven	International	Publishing,	
2017,	pp.	195-209.
39	 Lazić,	V.,	‘Enforcement	of	the	Arbitral	Awards	Annulled	in	the	Country	of	Origin’,	Croatian 
Arbitration Yearbook,	Vol.	13,	(2006),	pp.	179-204.	Generally,	on	the	possible	approaches	in	
the	enforcement	of	annulled	arbitral	awards,	see	Berg.,	A.	J.	van	den,	´Enforcement	of	Arbitral	
Awards	Annulled	in	Russia´,	Journal of International Arbitration,	Volume	27	Issue	2,	Kluwer	
Law	International	(2010),	p.	182-197.
40	 For	more	particulars	on	the	issue	of	the	possibility	to	follow	the	approach	of	the	French	courts	
in	other	jurisdictions,	 see	Van	den	Berg.,	A.J.,	´Enforcement	 of	Arbitral	Awards	Annulled	in	
Russia,	Journal of International Arbitration,	Volume	 27	 Issue	 2,	Kluwer	Law	 International	
(2010),	pp.	179	–	198,	addressing	the	possibilities	for	the	enforcement	of	annulled	awards.
41	 Decision	 of	 the	Amsterdam	 Court	 of	Appeal	 (Gerechtshof	Amsterdam)	 of	 28	April	 2009,	
200,005,269,	 Yukos	 Capital	 s.a.r.l.	 (Luxembourg)	 v.	 OAO	 Rosneft	 (Russian	 Federation),	
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another	 formula	 to	 the	 enforcement	 of	 an	 award	 that	 had	 been	 set	 aside	 by	 the	
competent	 court	 in	 the	country	where	 the	award	was	 rendered.	 It	was	 the	first	and	
so	 far	 the	only	decision	 to	 enforce	annulled	awards	 in	 the	Netherlands.42 Deciding	
on	a	request	for	enforcement	under	the	New	York	Convention,	the	President	of	 the	
Amsterdam	District	Court	(Voorzieningenrechter)	denied	the	enforcement	of	awards	
rendered	in	Russia	under	the	Rules	of	the	International	Commercial	Arbitration	Court	
(ICAC)	at	the	Chamber	of	Trade	and	Industry	of	the	Russian	Federation	 in	 Russia,	
because	 the	 awards	 had	been	 set	aside	 by	 the	 competent	 court	 in	Russia.43 In its 
judgment	of	28	April	2009,	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	reversed	this	decision	and	
granted	enforcement	for	reasons	that	can	be	summarised	as	follows:
The	1958	New	York	Convention	does	not	require	an	automatic	recognition	of	
annulment	decisions	in	the	country	where	their	enforcement	is	sought.	According	to	
the	reasoning	in	paras	3.5	and	3.6	of	the	judgment	´ the	New	York	Convention	does	not	
require	an	automatic	recognition	of	annulment	decisions	in	the	country	where	their	
enforcement	 is	 sought.	 Instead,	Dutch	general	 private	 international	 law	determines	
whether	the	annulment	decision	can	be	recognised	in	the	Netherlands.´
Press	 articles	 and	 the	 reports	 of	 international	 organisations,	 as	well	 as	 court	
decisions	in	 a	 number	 of	 jurisdictions,	 notably	 in	 England	 and	Wales,	 Lithuania,	
Switzerland	 and	 the	Netherlands,	 illustrate	 that	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 impartiality	 and	
independence	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	Russian	 courts	 in	 cases	 involving	 the	 interests	 of	
the	Russian	State.	For	these	reasons,	the	decision	of	the	Russian	court	annulling	the	
awards	should	not	be	given	effect	in	the	Netherlands.
It	is	irrelevant	that	the	party	requesting	the	enforcement	of	the	award	in	Yukos	
Capital	did	not	 provide	direct	 evidence	of	partiality	and	 dependence	 in	 the	 case	 at	
hand	 ‘in	part	 because	 partiality	 and	 dependence	 by	 their	 very	 nature	 take	 place	
behind	 the	scenes’.44
Points	(2)	and	especially	(3)	do	not	relate	to	the	interpretation	of	the	New	York	
Convention.	From	a	legal	point	of	view,	they	do	not	deserve	any	comment,	as	they	
are	clearly	not	based	on	legal	considerations.	The	arguments	used	have	been	rightly	
subjected	 to	 criticism,45 especially	the	obviously	inappropriate	view	 that	 there	was	
Tijdschrift	voor	Arbitrage	(TvA)	2011/1,	p.	15,	excerpt	in	Yearbook	Commercial	Arbitration	
2009	-	Volume	XXXIV,	Kluwer	Law	International	(2009),	Netherlands	No.	31,	pp.	703-714.
42	 Here	only	the	relevant	legal	issues	are	addressed.	References	to	the	 rather	peculiar	facts	and	
circumstances	of	the	case,	as	well	as	other	‘arbitration	unrelated’	aspects	and	considerations,	are	
omitted.
43	 Judgment	 of	 the	 Amsterdam	 District	 Court	 of	 28	 February	 2008,	 ECLI:NL:R-
BAMS:2008:BC8150.
44	 Decision	 of	 the	Amsterdam	Court	 of	Appeal	 (Gerechtshof)	 of	 28	April	 2009	 200,005,269,	
Yukos Capital s.a.r.l. (Luxembourg) v. OAO Rosneft (Russian Federation),	 case	 No.	
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BI2451,	available	at	http://www.rechtspraak.nl;	excerpt	in	Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration – Volume XXXIV,	Kluwer	Law	International	(2009).	Netherlands	No.	
31,	para.	21.	However,	see	 the	subsequent	judgment	of	 the	Amsterdam	District	 Court	 of	 17	
November	2011,	ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2011:BV5646,	par.	4.9.	In	this	case	the	Court	considered	
that	 this	 reasoning	was	 too	general	 to	 lead	 to	 the	conclusion	that	 the	Russian	judges	 in	 this	
particular	case	were	biased.
45	 For	 a	 criticism	of	 this	 decision,	 see	 Berg.,	A.	 J.	 van	 den, Enforcement	 of	Arbitral	Awards	
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no	 need	 to	 prove	 a	 lack	 of	 impartiality	 in	 the	 case	 at	 hand.	 It	 is	 to	 be	met	 with	
approval	that	it	was	not	followed	in	subsequent	decisions	by	the	Dutch	courts.	Thus,	
the	Amsterdam	District	 Court	 in	 its	 decision	 of	 17	November	 201146	clearly	 took	
into	 consideration	 whether	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 impartiality	 or	 independence	
could	be	determined	in	that	particular	case.	This	approach	is	in	stark	contrast	to	the	
line	of	reasoning	adopted	by	the	Court	in	the	Yukos case.	The	latter	held	that	there	was	
no	need	to	ascertain	the	lack	of	impartiality	in	the	case	that	it	dealt	with.	Instead	it	
relied	on	information	in	the	press	and	selected	literature	which	was	entirely	unrelated	
to	 the	 facts	 and	 circumstances	 of	 the	 case	 at	 hand.	 It	 seems,	 however,	 that	 even	
the	Amsterdam	Court	 of	Appeal	 subsequently	 changed	 this	 view	 in	 its	 decision	
27	September	2016.47	 In	 the	 latter	decision,	 the	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	did	
examine	whether	there	had	been	an	unfair	trial	in	the	case	at	hand.48	However,	this	
part	of	the	reasoning	will	not	be	further	discussed	as	it	is	of	no	relevance	for	a	legal	
analysis	and	interpretation	of	the	Convention.
As	for	the	reasoning	under	point	(1),	the	Court	first	held,	inter alia,	as	follows:	
‘[4]	(…)	However,	neither	this	provision	[of	Art.	V(1)(e)],	nor	the	further	provisions	
of	 the	 1958	 New	 York	 Convention	 or	 any	 other	 convention	 compel	 the	 Dutch	
enforcement	 court	 to	 recognize	 such	 decision	 of	 the	 Russian	 civil	 court	 directly.	
The	 question	whether	 the	 decision	of	 the	Russian	civil	court	annulling	 the	arbitral	
awards	can	be	recognized	in	the	Netherlands	must	be	answered	pursuant	to	the	rules	
of	general	private	international	law.’49
After	stating	that	‘a	Dutch	court	is	not	compelled	to	deny	leave	for	recognition	
of	 an	 annulled	 arbitral	 award	 if	 the	 foreign	 decision	 annulling	 the	 arbitral	 award	
cannot	be	recognized	in	the	Netherlands’,50 the	Court	continued	to	reason	that:
‘[6]	This	court	shall	therefore	first	examine	under	general	law	[commune recht]	
whether	 the	decisions	of	the	Russian	civil	court	annulling	the	arbitral	awards	of	19	
September	2006	can	be	recognized	in	the	Netherlands,	starting	from	the	consideration	
that	a	foreign	decision,	regardless	of	its	nature	and	scope,	is	recognized	if	a	number	
of	minimum	requirements	are	complied	with,	one	of	them	being	the	foreign	decision	
came	 into	existence	[in	proceedings	complying	with]	due	process.	There	 is	no	due	
process	when	it	must	be	deemed	that	the	foreign	decision	was	rendered	by	a	judicial	
Annulled	in	Russia, Journal of International Arbitration,	Volume	27	Issue	2	(2010)	pp.	179-
198.
46	 President	of	the	District	Court	of	Amsterdam	(‘Voorzieningenrechter, rechtbank Amsterdam)	
of	 17	 November	 2011,	 491569/KG	 RK	 11-1722,	 Nikolai Viktorovich Maximov v. OJSC 
Novolipetsky Metallurgichesky Kombinat,	excerpt	in	Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2012 – 
Volume XXXVII,	Kluwer	Law	International	 (2012),	Netherlands	No.	41,	pp.	274	–	276,	Kluwer.
47	 Decision	of	the	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	(Gerechtshof Amsterdam)	of	27	September	2016,	
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:3911.
48 Id., para. 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
49	 Decision	 of	 the	 Amsterdam	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 (Gerechtshof Amsterdam)	 of	 28	 April	 2009	
200,005,269,	 Yukos Capital s.a.r.l. (Luxembourg) v. OAO Rosneft (Russian Federation),	
case	 No.	 ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BI2451,	 available	 at	 http://www.rechtspraak.nl,	 excerpt	
in Yearbook Commercial Arbitration – Volume XXXIV,	 Kluwer	 Law	 International	 (2009),	
Netherlands	No.	31	para.	[4].
50 Id., para.	[5].
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authority	that	was	not	impartial	and	independent.’
Thus,	 the	Court	held	 that	 reliance	on	 the	 reason	under	Article	V(1)(e)	of	 the	
Convention	depended	on	whether	or	not	a	decision	on	the	annulment	in	the	country	
of	 origin	 could	 be	 recognised	 in	 the	Netherlands.	This	 reasoning	finds	 no	 support	
either	in	the	text	and	preparatory	 documents	of	the	New	York	Convention	or	in	court	
decisions	applying	the	Convention	in	and	outside	the	Netherlands.	In	this	context,	the	
reasoning	of	 the	US	Pemex judgment	must	be	distinguished	 from	the	 reasoning	of	
the	Dutch	court	in	the	Yukos case	in	view	of	the	repeatedly	emphasised	‘exceptional	
circumstances’	prevailing	in	the	US	Pemex case.	There	is	not	much	to	be	added	to	the	
view	expressed	by	van	den	Berg	in	his	criticism	of	the	decision.51 Yet	another	point	
may	be	raised	with	 respect	 to	 the	Court’s	 reliance	on	‘general	private	international	
law’	(commune recht).
In	the	view	of	the	Court,	the	enforcement	of	an	annulled	arbitral	award	depends	
on	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 annulment	 judgment	 fulfils	 the	 conditions	 for	 recognition	
and	enforcement	under	the	general	private	international	law	rules	of	the	country	of	
enforcement.	 Presumably	 it	was	meant	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 rules	 on	 the	 recognition	 of	
foreign	 judgments	 developed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 case	 law	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 as	
the	Court	does	not	 refer	 to	any	particular	provision	of	any	law	in	 the	Netherlands.	
Even	though	Article	431	of	the	Dutch	Code	of	Civil	Procedure	reflects	the	relevant	
case	law	concerning	the	conditions	for	enforcement	of	foreign	judgments,	the	Court	
could	not	have	expressly	referred	to	this	provision	as	it	relates	to	the	‘enforcement’	
of	 condemnatory	 judgments.	As	 such,	 it	 cannot	 be	 relied	 upon	 in	 the	 context	 of	
recognising	a	foreign	annulment	judgment.	According	to	the	rules	developed	by	the	
courts	in	the	Netherlands,	a	foreign	judgment	may	be	recognised	if	certain	conditions	
are	 satisfied,	 in	 particular:	whether	 the	 foreign	 court	 had	 jurisdiction	 to	 decide	
the	 case	 on	 the	 basis	 of	internationally	accepted	criteria,	 that	 the	requirement	of	
due	process	has	been	complied	with	and	the	decision	is	not	contrary	to	Dutch	public	
policy.
However,	 it	 is	 questionable	whether	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 apply	 the	 ‘commune 
recht’	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 recognition	 of	 foreign	 decisions	 to	 foreign	 judgments	
annulling	an	arbitral	award.	Namely,	the	developed	case	law	relates	to	the	recognition	
of	 foreign	 decisions	 that	 mainly	 concern	 ‘substantive’	 claims	 and	 obligations	 of	
the	 parties	 -	 constitutive,	 declaratory	 and	 condemnatory	 decisions	 and	 judgments	
rejecting	 a	 claim.52 It	 is	 doubtful	whether	 it	 is	appropriate	to	apply	the	concept	and	
system	of	recognition	provided	for	judgments	dealing	with	substantive	claims	in	the	
context	of	recognising	foreign	annulment	judgments.	The	latter	do	not	deal	with	and	
do	not	affect	substantive	entitlements	and	obligations	of	the	parties.	Instead	they	have	
procedural	legal	consequences	and	effects:	they	determine	the	(lack	of)	effectiveness	
of	 another	 decision	 –	 an	 arbitral	 award.	 It	 should	 be	 emphasised	 that	 the	 issue	 of	
the	 recognition	 of	 foreign	 annulment	 judgments	 has	 never	 been	 previously	 raised	
51	 Berg.,	 A.	 J.	 van	 den,	 ‘Enforcement	 of	 Arbitral	 Awards	 Annulled	 in	 Russia’,	 Journal	 of	
International	Arbitration,	Volume	27,	Issue	2	(2010),	p.	189.
52	 Strikwerda,	 L.,	 Inleiding	 tot	 het	 Nederlandse	 internationaal	 privaatrecht,	 Kluwer,	 Deventer	
(2015),	pp.	291	and	293.
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before	 the	Dutch	courts.	 In	a	similar	vein,	all	decisions	relating	to	arbitration,	 thus	
also	decisions	rendered	 in	 setting	 aside	 proceedings,	 fall	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
Brussels	 I	Regulation	on	the	recognition	and	enforcement	of	foreign	judgments.
4.2. Incorrect interpretation of Article III of the 1958 New York 
Convention
The	 controversial	 decision	 of	 the	Amsterdam	Court	 of	Appeal	 did	 reach	 the	
Dutch	Supreme	Court,53 but	 unfortunately	 the	 latter	did	not	 engage	 in	 a	discussion	
on	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 enforcement	 of	 annulled	 arbitral	 awards	 in	 the	
Netherlands.	Namely,	the	Supreme	Court	simply	declared	that	recourse	in	cassation	
was	inadmissible.	It	based	its	decision	on	the	interpretation	of	the	relevant	provisions	
of	Articles	 1062	and	 1063	of	 the	Arbitration	Act	 in	 connection	with	Article	 III	 of	
the	New	York	Convention.	The	provisions	of	Articles	1062	and	1063	 relate	 to	 the	
enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 rendered	 in	 the	 Netherlands.	 Considering	 that	
recourse	 in	 cassation	 is	 inadmissible	against	 leave	 for	enforcement	with	 respect	 to	
the	awards	rendered	in	the	Netherlands,	the	Supreme	Court	concluded	that	it	was	also	
inadmissible	in	proceedings	for	the	enforcement	of	foreign	arbitral	awards,	within	the	
view	of	Article	 III	of	 the	New	York	Convention.	Namely,	 it	construed	the	wording	
in	Article	III	that	‘[t]here	shall	not	be	imposed	substantially	more	onerous	conditions	
or	higher	 fees	or	charges	on	 the	 recognition	 or	 enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	…	
than	are	imposed	on	the	recognition	or	enforcement	of	domestic	arbitral	awards’	so	
as	to	imply	that	the	relevant	provisions	on	the	enforcement	of	domestic	awards	had	
to	be	analogously	applied	in	enforcement	under	the	Convention.	This	is	the	first	time	
since	the	Netherlands	ratified	the	Convention	that	such	an	interpretation	was	applied.	
After	it	was	raised	for	the	first	time	in	the	literature,54 it	received	no	or	little	support	
in	legal	writings.	Yet	the	Supreme	Court	based	its	decision	almost	exclusively	on	this	
particular	publication.	Before	that	it	not	was	even	doubted	that	an	appeal	or	recourse	
in	 cassation	 would	 be	 unavailable	 against	 a	 decision	 granting	 enforcement	 when	
the	enforcement	is	requested	on	the	basis	of	Article	1075,	i.e.,	under	the	New	York	
Convention.55
The	 correctness	 of	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 must	 be	 questioned,	
53	 Decision	of	the	Supreme	Court	(Hoge Raad)	of	25	June	2010,	First	Chamber,	09/02565	EE,Y 
OAO Rosneft (Russian Federation) v. Yukos Capital s.a.r.l. (Luxembourg),	original	decision	
in	 Case	 no.	 ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BM1679	 available	 at	 http://www.rechtspraak.nl,	 excerpt	 in	
English	in	Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2010 - Volume XXXV,	Kluwer	Law	International	
(2010),	Netherlands	No.	34,	pp.	423	–	426.
54	 For	the	first	time	the	issue	of	the	‘prohibition	of	discrimination	under	Article	III	of	the	New	
York	Convention	on	 leave	 for	 an	 enforcement	 procedure	 in	 the	Netherlands’	was	 raised	 in	
a	 publication	 by	 the	 Dutch	 practising	 lawyer	 Ph.	De	Korte,	 ’Welke	 consequenties	heft	 het	
discriminatieverbod	 van	 artikel	 III	 van	 het	 Verdrag	 van	 New	 York	 voor	 de	 Nederlandse	
exequaturprocedure’	TvA no.	3	(2007).
55	 Decision	of	the	Court	of	Appeal	(Gerechtshof)	of	Amsterdam	of	16	July	1992,	G.W.L. Kersten 
& Co. B.V. v. Société Commerciale Raoul-Duval et Cie,	 excerpt	 in	 Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration,	 Kluwer	 Law	 International	 (1992),	 Netherlands	No.	 16	 –	 the	 District	 Court	 of	
Utrecht	had	granted	the	request	for	enforcement	and	an	appeal	was	permitted.
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especially	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 mentioned	 provisions	 of	 the	 Dutch	 Act	 on	 the	
‘conditions	 for	 enforcement’	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	Article	 III	 of	 the	 New	 York	
Convention.	Such	interpretation	erroneously	 implies	 that	 the	purpose	of	Article	 III	
was	to	unify	not	only	the	conditions	for	the	recognition	and	enforcement	of	foreign	
arbitral	 awards,	 but	 also	 the	 conditions	 and	 procedures	 for	 the	 enforcement	 of	
domestic	 awards.	 Furthermore,	 it	 would	seem	as	 if	 the	purpose	of	Article	 III	was	
to	 impose	 the	 obligation	 upon	 the	Member	 States	 to	 have	 a	 uniform	 system	 of	
enforcement	 for	 both	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 awards.	 There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 the	
Convention	never	was	intended	to	achieve	such	effect	and	purpose.	As	rightly	pointed	
out	in	the	commentary	to	this	decision,	the	interpretation	of	this	provision	followed	
by	the	Dutch	Supreme	Court	finds	no	support	either	in	the	text	of	the	Convention	or	
in	the	legislative	history	of	Article	III.56
It	 is	 not	 only	that	 the	Supreme	Court	 incorrectly	 interpreted	 the	Convention,	
but	it	also	erroneously	applied	 the	relevant	provisions	of	 the	Dutch	Arbitration	Act.	
In	 particular,	 it	 is	obviously	 inappropriate	 to	 analogously	 apply	Articles	 1062	 and	
1063	in	the	context	of	the	enforcement	of	‘foreign’	arbitral	awards.	This	is	especially	
so	 considering	 that	 a	 party	 against	whom	 the	 enforcement	 of	 a	 ‘domestic’	 award	
is	 granted	does	have	a	 remedy	against	 this	decision,	which	 is	an	action	 for	setting	
aside.	In	other	words,	there	is	no	right	of	appeal	or	a	right	of	recourse	in	cassation,	
but	 there	 is	 another	 available	 remedy	or	means	of	 recourse	–	 an	action	 for	 setting	
aside	and	 in	exceptional	circumstances	a	 request	 for	 the	 revocation	of	 the	award.57 
In	the	procedure	for	setting	aside,	a	party	will	have	the	possibility	of	both	an	appeal	
and	recourse	in	cassation.	Obviously,	these	remedies	-	setting	aside	or	exceptionally	
revocation	-	are	not	available	to	a	party	against	which	an	enforcement	of	a	foreign	
arbitral	award	is	requested	in	the	Netherlands,	as	the	seat	of	arbitration	is	not	in	the	
Netherlands.	Consequently,	the	decision	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	25	June	2010	leaves	
such	a	party	with	no	remedy	at	 all	 even	 if	 the	 lower	courts	 -	a	District	Court	or	a	
Court	of	Appeal	-	would	have	rendered	obviously	incorrect	decisions	when	applying	
the	New	York	Convention	or	Dutch	law.58 The	reasoning	of	the	Supreme	Court	that	a	
56	 Berg.,	A.J.,	van	den,	‘Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards	Annulled	in	Russia	–	Case	Comment	on	
Dutch	Supreme	Court	of	25	June	2010,	28	Journal	of	International	Arbitration,	Issue	6	(2011)	
pp.	617-641.	Yet	in	its	decision	of	20	December	2012	The	Hague	Court	of	Appeal	confirmed	
the	judgment	of	the	Supreme	Court	and	decided	that	the	prohibition	of	recourse	when	leave	is	
granted	for	a	foreign	arbitral	award	that	falls	within	the	scope	of	the	New	York	Convention	does	
not	infringe	the	right	to	a	fair	trial	in	Article	6	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights.	See,	
The	Hague	Court	of	Appeal	20	December	2011,	ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BU8275,	par.	9-13.	
A	similar	decision	was	reached	by	the	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	in	2016.	See,	Amsterdam	
Court	of	Appeal,	 19	 July	2016,	ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:2948,	par.	 3.12-3.14.	See	 also,	 the	
judgment	of	the	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	of	24	June	2014,	ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:2442,	
par.	2.6-2.10.
57	 For	criticism	of	the	judgment	of	the	Supreme	Court,	see	Berg,	A.J.	van	den,	Enforcement	of	
Arbitral	Awards	Annulled	 in	Russia	–	Case	Comment	on	Dutch	Supreme	Court	of	25	 June	
2010,	Journal of International Arbitration,	Kluwer	Law	International	(2011)	Volume	28	Issue	
6,	pp.	617-641.	
58	 Such	a	result	may	be	contrary	to	the	constitutional	right	to	legal	remedies,	a	right	which	is	also	
incorporated	in	the	EU	(Charter	on	Fundamental	Rights).
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possibility	for	setting	aside	is	available	in	the	country	of	the	seat	of	arbitration,	so	that	
a	party	is	not	without	a	remedy,	is	difficult	to	comprehend,	especially	considering	that	
any	such	decision	can	apparently	be	ignored	by	the	Dutch	courts.
It	 is	 even	 more	 difficult	 to	 understand	 the	 reasoning	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	
when	the	scope	of	application	of	the	Arbitration	Act	 is	 taken	into	consideration.	 In	
particular,	 the	 scope	 is	 very	 clearly	 defined:	 there	 are	 provisions	 that	 apply	when	
arbitration	 is	 held	 in	 the	Netherlands	 (Title	 One)	 and	 provisions	 that	 apply	 to	
arbitrations	 outside	 the	 Netherlands	(Title	Two).	There	is	no	doubt	that	Article	1062	
and	1063	are	contained	in	Title	One	which	regulates	arbitration	within the	Netherlands.	
Accordingly,	the	provisions	on	which	the	Supreme	Court	relied	upon	are	not	meant	to	
be	applied	in	the	context	of	foreign	arbitrations.
It	should	be	emphasised	that	the	legal	reasoning	of	the	Supreme	Court	implies	
that	the	possibility	to	appeal	and	file	recourse	in	cassation	against	a	decision	granting	
enforcement	 is	available	when	the	enforcement	is	under	Article	1076,	i.e.,	when	no	
treaty	applies	or	when	 its	 applicability	 is	 permitted	 under	 a	 treaty,	 such	 as	Article	
VII(1)	of	 the	Convention.	 In	 the	reasoning	 of	 the	 Court	 this	 is	 so	 because	 in	 the	
enforcement	 under	 Article	 1076	 there	 is	 no	 such	 requirement	which	 is	 allegedly	
imposed	under	Article	III	of	the	Convention.	This	is	an	apparent	paradox,	considering	
that	 the	 Dutch	Act	 provides	 for	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 same	 provisions	 of	 the	
Code	 of	 Civil	 Procedure	 regarding	 the	 enforcement	of	 foreign	arbitral	awards.59 
Consequently,	 the	 ruling	of	 the	Supreme	Court	 renders	 this	 provision	meaningless	
even	 though	 it	contains	more	 favourable	conditions	 for	 the	enforcement	of	 foreign	
arbitral	awards.	Such	legal	reasoning	significantly	undermines	the	effectiveness	of	the	
more	favourable	legal	provision	of	Article	1076.	 It	 renders	 the	provision	of	Article	
1076	less	likely	to	be	relied	upon,	even	though	it	contains	more	favourable	grounds	
for	 enforcement.	 Consequently,	 this	 provision	 remains	more	 favourable	 only	with	
respect	to	the	grounds	on	the	basis	of	which	the	enforcement	may	be	refused.	Before	
the	ruling	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	25	June	2010,	the	provision	of	Article	1076	had	
been	 rather	 frequently	invoked,60 as	 it	does	provide	 for	a	more	liberal	enforcement	
regime	 than	Article	V	of	 the	New	York	Convention	within	 the	meaning	of	Article	
VII(1)	of	 the	Convention.	 In	 conclusion,	 the	decision	of	 the	Supreme	Court	 is	 the	
59	 The	different	approach	in	applying	these	provisions	has	been	explained	by	the	Supreme	Court	
to	the	effect	that	these	provisions	of	the	Code	of	Civil	Procedure	apply	unless	a	treaty	provides	
otherwise	(and	Article	III	allegedly	does	provide	otherwise	in	the	view	of	the	Court).
60	 See	 e.g.,	Decision	of	Dubai Drydocks v. Bureau voor Scheeps- en Werktuigbouw [X] B.V.,	
President	of	the	District	Court	of	Dordrecht	(Voorzieningenrechter, Rechtbank,	Dordrecht)	of	
30	June	2010,	Case	No.	79684	/	KG	RK	09-85,	Yearbook Commercial Arbitration,	(Kluwer	
Law	 International)	 Netherlands	 No.	 35,	 p.	 299	 et seq., relying	primarily	on	Art.	 1076	 and	
subsidiarily	on	Art.	 1075	 of	 the	Act);	 President	 of	 the	 District	 Court	 of	Amsterdam	 of	 18	
June	 2009,	 Voorzieningenrechter, Rechtbank, Amsterdam, LoJack Equipment Ireland Ltd. 
(Ireland) v. A, 411230/KG	 RK	 08-3652,	 18	 June	 2009,	Netherlands	 No.	 32;	 Decision	 of	
the	District	Court	(Arrondissementsrechtbank)	of	Almelo	of	 19	 July	2000,	Société d'Etudes 
et de Commerce SA v. Weyl Beef Products BV, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration,	Kluwer	
Law	International	(2001)	Netherlands	No.	26.;	Decision	of	the	President	of	the	District	Court	
(Rechtbank)	of	Rotterdam	of	24	November	1994,	 Isaac Glecer v. Moses Israel Glecer and, 
Estera Glecer-Nottman, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (1996)	Netherlands	No.	19.
V. LAZIĆ-SMOLJANIĆ, Enforcing annulled arbitral awards: a comparison of...
Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, vol. 39, br. 1, 215-240 (2018)232
result	of	an	incorrect	interpretation	and	application	of	both	the	New	York	Convention	
and	Dutch	statutory	arbitration	law.
Unfortunately,	 the	 Dutch	 legislator	 when	 revising	 the	 law	 in	 2015	 missed	
the	 opportunity	 to	 remedy	 the	 unsatisfactory	 legal	 reasoning	 of	 the	 Supreme	
Court	 in	 the	decision	concerned.61 Yet	under	 the	new	2015	Act	 jurisdiction	for	 the	
enforcement	 of	 foreign	 arbitral	 awards	 is	 vested	 in	 the	Courts	 of	Appeal,	whereas	
jurisdiction	for	the	enforcement	of	domestic	awards	has	remained	with	the	District	
Courts.	Vesting	jurisdiction	in	different	courts	could	be	seen	as	an	indication	that	the	
analogous	application	of	Title	One	on	the	enforcement	of	foreign	arbitral	awards	is	
inappropriate.	It	is	still	to	be	seen	in	practice	whether	vesting	jurisdiction	in	the	Court	
of	Appeal	for	enforcing	foreign	awards	in	the	new	2015	Act	will	imply	the	possibility	
to	deviate	from	the	legal	reasoning	in	the	decision	of	25	June	2010,	but	unfortunately,	
it	is	unlikely	that	the	amendment	concerned	would	in	any	way	alter	the	Yukos rule.	
Regrettably	the	incorrect	 interpretation	that	Article	III	precludes	the	right	 to	appeal	
and	to	recourse	in	cassation	has	been	firmly	established	as	a	part	of	Dutch	law	and	
confirmed	in	subsequent	decisions.62
In	 conclusion,	 the	 Dutch	 Supreme	 Court	 in	 its	 decision	 of	 25	 June	 201063 
refused	 to	rule	on	a	recourse	in	cassation	filed	against	the	decision	of	the	Amsterdam	
Court	 of	Appeal	 holding	 the	 application	 to	 be	 inadmissible.	 The	 Court	 held	 that	
Article	III	of	the	1958	New	York	Convention	deprived	parties	of	the	right	to	appeal	
and	recourse	in	cassation.	Thus,	a contrario,	both	an	appeal	and	recourse	in	cassation	
are	available	against	leave	for	enforcement	granted	under	Article	1076	of	the	Dutch	
Arbitration	Act,64 but	not	if	the	enforcement	is	granted	under	Article	1075,65 i.e.,	under	
the	1958	New	York	Convention.66
61	 Unfortunately,	the	wording	in	the	final	text	of	the	2015	Act	does	not	seem	to	imply	changes	in	
that	respect.
62	 See	 e.g.,	 the	 judgment	 of	 the	 Amsterdam	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 of	 16	 October	
2012ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:2875	 published	 in	 2014	 at	 http://deeplink.rechtspraak.
nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:2875;	 judgment	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	
15	 April	 2015	 ECLI:NL:HR2015:1077	 published	 on	 http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/
uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:HR:2015:1077;	 judgment	 of	 the	 Amsterdam	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 of	
17	 July	 2016,	 ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:2948	 available	 on	 http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl /
uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:2948; judgment	 of	 the	 Amsterdam	 Court	 of	 Appeal	
of	 24	June	2014,	 ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:2442	available	on	http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl /
uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:2442 (last	seen	on	9	January	2017).
63	 Decision	of	the	Supreme	Court	(Hoge Raad)	of	25	June	2010,	First	Chamber,	09/02565	EE,Y 
OAO Rosneft (Russian Federation) v. Yukos Capital s.a.r.l. (Luxembourg),	original	decision	
in	 Case	 No.	 LJN:	 BM1679	 available	 on	 http://www.rechtspraak.nl,	 excerpt	 in	 English	 in	
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2010 - Volume XXXV,	Kluwer	Law	 International	 (2010)	
Netherlands	No.	34,	pp.	423-426.
64	 Article	1076	of	the	2015	Arbitration	Act	applies	to	the	enforcement	of	foreign	arbitral	awards	
when	no	treaty	is	applicable,	i.e.,	when	the	enforcement	is	sought	on	the	basis	of	the	domestic	
law	on	arbitration.
65	 Article	1075	applies	when	the	enforcement	is	sought	on	the	basis	of	a	treaty,	i.e.,	on	the	basis	of	
the	1958	New	York	Convention	which	is	the	relevant	treaty	in	this	respect.
66	 This	a	contrario	argumentation	was	subsequently	affirmed	by	the	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	
on	16	October	2012,	ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:2875,	par.	2.5.	Here	the	court	decided	that	Article	
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4.3. Supreme Court Decision of 24 November 201767
After	the	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	had	refused	to	enforced	another	arbitral	
award	set	aside	by	the	Russian	courts,	the	case	appeared	in	front	of	the	Hoge Raad 
(Dutch	Supreme	Court).68	Firstly,	the	Hoge Raad	stated	that	in	the	expert	statement,	
they	did	not	find	any	reasons	to	assume	impartiality	of	the	Russian	Arbitration	Court	
which	rendered	the	annulment	decision.	The	Supreme	Court	upheld	the	judgments	of	
the	court	of	first	instance	and	of	the	Court	of	Appeal,	the	reasoning	can	be	summarised	
as	follows.
The	court	observed	that	in	the	authentic	English	text	of	Article	V	of	the	New	York	
Convention	of	1958	(which	is	consistent	with	the	authentic	Spanish	text)	reference	is	
made	to	‘may	be	refused	(...)	only	if’	-	which	is	an	indication	that	the	judge	has	some	
discretionary	power	 -	while	 the	 authentic	French	 text	 refers	 to	 ‘ne	 seront	 refusées	
(...)	que	si’	-	which	is	an	indication	that	there	is	a	rule	that	the	judge	does	not	have	a	
margin	of	discretion.	The	Court	relies	on	Article	33(4)	of	the	Vienna	Convention	and	
concludes	Article	V(1)	of	 the	New	York	Convention	was	 to	be	given	 the	meaning	
which,	taking	into	account	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	New	York	Convention,	best	
reconciled	the	various	authentic	treaty	texts.69	It	has	concluded	that	it	would	be	best	
to	then	interpret	this	provision	in	such	a	way	that	it	gives	the	judge	a	certain	margin	
of	discretion	to	recognise	a	foreign	arbitral	award	and	to	grant	enforcement,	even	if	
in	the	specific	case	one	or	more	of	the	grounds	for	refusal	set	out	in	this	Article	V	can	
be	applied.70
The	 foregoing	means	 that	Article	V(1)(e)	 1958	New	York	Convention,	must	
be	interpreted	in	such	a	way	that	the	setting	aside	of	a	foreign	arbitration	award	by	a	
competent	authority	of	the	country	where	the	judgment	was	rendered	or	pursuant	to	
which	national	laws	the	judgment	was	given,	does	not	prevent	the	court	from	using	
the	 margin	 of	 discretion,	 under	 special	 circumstances,	 to	 grant	 enforcement	 of	 a	
previously	annulled	arbitral	award.	Such	a	special	case	is,	inter	alia,	the	case	if	the	
annulment	of	 the	arbitration	award	 in	 the	 foreign	 judgment	of	destruction	 is	based	
on	grounds	that	do	not	correspond	to	the	grounds	for	refusal	set	out	in	Article	V(1)	
preamble	and	under	a-d,	1958	New	York	Convention,	and	those	grounds	are	also	not	
generally	acceptable	by	international	standards.	Such	a	special	case	also	applies	if	the	
foreign	judgment	is	not	eligible	for	recognition	in	the	Netherlands	if	it	does	not	fulfill	
conditions	 for	 the	 recognition	of	 foreign	 judgements	provided	under	Dutch	private	
international	law.71
1076	did	not	prohibit	recourse	in	cassation	since	this	prohibition	was	a	matter	of	national	law	
and	 found	 application	 to	 foreign	 arbitral	 awards	 only	 through	Article.	 III	 of	 the	 1958	New	
York	Convention.	See	also,	the	judgment	of	the	Netherlands	Supreme	Court	of	17	April	2015,	
ECLI:NL:HR:2015:1077.
67	 Decision	of	the	Supreme	Court	(Hoge Raad)	of	24	November	2017	ECLI:NL:HR:2017:2992.
68	 HR,	24-11-2017,	ECLI:NL:HR:2017:2992.
69 Ibid., para. 3.4.3.
70 Ibid., para. 3.4.5.
71 Ibid.,	para.	3.4.6;	HR	26	September	2014,	ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2838,	NJ	2015/478,	rov.	3.6.4.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
At	first	glance,	 the	approach	 followed	by	the	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	 in	
the Yukos case	resembles	 the	reasoning	of	 the	Circuit	Court	decision	 in	 the	Pemex 
judgment.	However,	a	closer	 look	at	 the	Yukos decision	 reveals	 some	 fundamental	
differences	between	the	two	judgments.	Thus,	the	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	first	
considered	whether	the	annulment	judgment	of	the	Russian	court	could	pass	the	test	
as	set	out	in	Dutch	general	private	international	law.	The	requirement	in	dispute	here	
was	the	one	that	demands	that	the	judgement	that	is	being	recognised	–	in	this	case	
the	judgement	on	the	setting	aside	of	the	award	–	fulfils	the	demands	of	a	decent	legal	
procedure.	Only	if	this	is	the	case	can	the	recognition	and	enforcement	of	a	foreign	
annulled	arbitral	award	be	refused,	according	to	the	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal.
The	difference	with	the	Pemex and Termorio judgments	is	fundamental.	Whilst	
the	 US	 Courts	 considered	 the	 public	 policy	 gloss	 to	 be	 an	 exception	 to	 the	 rule	
laid	down	in	Article	V	(1)	(e)	 so	 that	 there	would	generally	be	no	recognition	and	
enforcement	of	an	arbitral	award	that	has	be	set	aside	by	the	competent	authority	in	
the	country	of	origin,	the	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	developed	a	hard	and	fast	rule	
instead	of	an	exception.	Thus,	when	applying	Article	V	(1)	(e)	of	the	1958	New	York	
Convention,	each	annulment	 judgment	 is	 to	be	 subjected	to	the	requirements	as	set	
out	in	Dutch	general	private	international	law.	As	a	Dutch	recognizing	court	always	
has	 to	 consider	 whether	 a	 foreign	 ‘setting	 aside	 judgement’	 fulfils	 Dutch	 general	
(‘commune’) private	 international	 law	 requirements,	 it	 makes	 Article	 V	 (1)	 (e)	
redundant.72
Such	an	interpretation	of	Article	V	(1)	(e)	of	the	1958	New	York	Convention	is	
not	only	incorrect,	but	is	rather	unwelcome	and	counterproductive	as	it	undermines	
the	certainty	of	the	enforcement	regime	of	the	Convention	which	presents	a	globally	
unified	system	for	the	recognition	and	enforcement	of	foreign	arbitral	awards.73 It is to 
be	regretted	that	the	reasoning	of	the	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal	has	been	upheld	in	
several	subsequent	cases	and	accordingly	represents	the	current	state	of	the	law	in	the	
Netherlands.	Finally,	the	Dutch	Supreme	Court	in	its	recent	decision	of	24	November	
2017	upholds	the	view	that	an	annulled	award	can	be	enforced	in	the	Netherlands	in	
the	circumstances	when	the	judgment	annulling	the	award	does	not	comply	with	the	
conditions	for	the	recognition	of	foreign	judgments.	
The	recent	case	law	in	the	United	States	and	in	The	Netherlands	illustrates	that	
guidance	for	the	interpretation	of	the	1958	New	York	Convention	would	be	welcome,	
even	 though	 the	 enforcement	 of	 annulled	 awards	 does	 not	 occur	 very	 frequently.	
Yet	 every	 attempt	 to	 enforce	 such	 awards	 undermines	 the	 effectiveness	 and	
uniform	 application	 of	 the	 1958	New	York	Convention.	The	present	 author	 is	 of	
the	opinion	that	annulled	arbitral	awards	in	principle	 should	 not	 be	 given	 effect	 in	
other	 jurisdiction	 where	 the	 enforcement	 is	 sought,	even	when	the	annulment	was	
result	 of	 an	 excessive	 court	 control	 in	 the	 country	where	 the	award	was	 rendered.	
72	 A.	J.	van	den	Berg,	“Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards	Annulled	in	Russia,	Case	comment	on	
Court	of	Appeal	of	Amsterdam,	April	28,	2009”,	Journal of International Arbitration, 2010,	p.	
189-190.
73 Id.
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By	choosing	the	seat	of	arbitration	in	a	legal	system	which	has	arbitration	unfriendly	
legal	 framework	 the	parties	 are	deemed	to	accept	such	extensive	court	control	and	
must	be	aware	of	the	risk	that	the	award	ultimately	may	be	annulled	for	reasons	that	
do	not	meet	internationally	accepted	standards.	The	only	exception	should	be	if	the	
annulment	would	imply	a	denial	of	access	to	justice,	i.e.,	if	it	would	result	in	loss	of	
the	right	to	legal	remedy	in	any	forum.	Yet	it	seems	that	the	prevailing	view	is	that	
there	may	be	other	circumstances	in	which	an	annulment	judgment	should	be	ignored.	
In	any	case,	the	variety	of	opinions	on	this	issue	points	to	the	need	of	some	guidelines	
on	 the	 international	 level	which	would	 favour	 a	more	 uniform	 interpretation	 and	
application	of	the	Convention	and	would	consequently	 enhance	 the	 degree	 of	 legal	
certainty	 and	 predictability	 in	 enforcing	 foreign	arbitral	awards.
V. LAZIĆ-SMOLJANIĆ, Enforcing annulled arbitral awards: a comparison of...
Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, vol. 39, br. 1, 215-240 (2018)236
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Berg,	A.J.,	van	den	“Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards	Annulled	in	Russia,	Case	comment	
on	Court	of	Appeal	of	Amsterdam,	April	28,	2009”,	Journal of International Arbitration 
2010.
2. Berg,	A.J.,	 van	 den,	 ´Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards	Annulled	 in	 Russia´,	 Journal 
of International Arbitration,	Volume	27	 Issue	2,	Kluwer	Law	International	(2010)	p.	
182-197.
3. Berg,	 A.J.,	 van	 den,	 ‘Enforcement	 of	 Arbitral	 Awards	 Annulled	 in	 Russia	 –	 Case	
Comment	 on	 Dutch	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 25	 June	 2010,	 28	 Journal of International 
Arbitration,	Issue	6	(2011)	pp.	617-641.	
4. Berg,	A.J.,	van	den,	9	JCC Bulletin (Nov.	1998)	pp.	15	et seq.
5. Feinacht,	 F.,	 ‘Enforcement	 of	 Annulled	 Foreign	Arbitral	Awards	 in	 Germany’,	 19	
Journal of International Arbitration 4	(2002),	313	et seq.,	at	p.	314,	n.	6.	
6. Gharavi,	H.G.,	'Chromalloy:	Another	view'	 12	Mealey's Int. Arb. Rep. 5 (Mav	1997),	
21	at	p.	22-23.
7. Lazić,	 V.	 ‘The	 Interpretation	 and	Application	 of	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 in	 the	
Netherlands”,	in:	G.A.	Bermann	(ed.),	Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards	-	The Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention by National 
Courts,, Ius	Comparatum	–	Global	Studies	in	Comparative	Law,	Springer	Publishing	
(2017)	pp.	689-731	and	‘‘Enforcing	Annulled	Arbitral	Awards	in	The	Netherlands’,	in:	
H.	Koster/F.	Pennings/C.
8.	 Lazić,	V.,	 ‘Enforcement	of	 the	Arbitral	Awards	Annulled	 in	 the	 Country	of	Origin’,	
Croatian Arbitration Yearbook,	Vol.	13	(2006),	pp.	179-204.
9. Paulsson,	 J.,	'Rediscovering	the	NY	Convention:	Further	Reflections	on	 Chromalloy’,	
Mealey's International Arbitration Report, 17	(April	1997)	 4,	p.	 34.
10. Rivkin,	 D.	V.,	‘The	Enforcement	of 	Awards	Nullified	in	 the	Country	 of	Origin: 	The	
American	Experience’,	 in:	 van	 den	 Berg,	 A.J.,	 (ed.),	 Improving the Efficiency of 
Arbitration Agreements and Awards, ICCA	Congress	 series	No.	 9	(1999)	 528,	534	
et seq. 
11. Rusu	 (eds),	 Essays	 on	 Private	 &	 Business	 Law:	 A	 Tribute	 to	 Professor	 Adriaan	
Dprresteijn,	Eleven	International	Publishing,	2017,	pp.	195-209.
12. Sampliner,	G.	H.,	‘Enforcement	of	Nullified	Foreign	Arbitral	Awards	 -	Chromalloy 
Revisited’,	14	J. Int. (1997),	 125	at	p.	132.
13. Schlosser,	P	.,	Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung par.	1044	 n	.	 89	 (Stein/Jonas,	21	
st.	 ed.,	1994).	
14. Schwartz,	E.,	 'A	Comment	on	Chromalloy - Hilmarton	 a	l'americaine'14	J. Int' l Arb. 
2	(1997)	 125,	at	p.	132.
15. Strikwerda,	 L.,	 Inleiding	 tot	 het	 Nederlandse	 internationaal	 privaatrecht,	 Kluwer,	
Deventer	(2015),	pp.	291	and	293.
V. LAZIĆ-SMOLJANIĆ, Enforcing annulled arbitral awards: a comparison of...
Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, vol. 39, br. 1, 215-240 (2018) 237
Vesna Lazić-Smoljanić*74
Sažetak
PRESUDE U PREDMETIMA YUKOS I PEMEX: IMAJU LI 
SUDOVI U NIZOZEMSKOJ I SJEDINJENIM AMERIČKIM 
DRŽAVAMA ISTI PRISTUP GLEDE OVRHE PONIŠTENIH 
ARBITRAŽNIH PRAVORIJEKA?
U	članku	se	analiziraju	procesnopravni	aspekti	priznanja	i	izvršenja	arbitražnih	
odluka	koje	su	poništene	u	državi	gdje	su	donesene.	Rad	se	koncentrira	na	relativno	
nedavno	odlučene	slučajeve	u	SAD	i	Nizozemskoj,	u	kojima	su	sudovi	primijenili	
ponešto	drugačiji	pristup	od	onoga	koji	je	primijenila	sudska	praksa	u	Francuskoj	prije	
više	 godina.	 Pravno	 rezoniranje	 francuske	 sudske	 prakse	 kod	 priznanja	 poništenih	
arbitražnih	 odluka	 temelji	 se	 na	 primjeni	 domaćega	 prava	 o	 priznanju	 i	 izvršenju	
arbitražnih	odluka.	Naime,	domaće	pravo	Francuske	povoljnije	je	od	režima	priznanja	
prema	Newyorškoj	konvenciji	 o	priznanju	 i	 izvršenju	 stranih	 arbitražnih	odluka	 iz	
1958.	Sudovi	u	SAD	i	Nizozemskoj	nedavno	su	primijenili	drugačiji	pristup	prilikom	
priznanja	 i	 izvršenja	 poništenih	 odluka.	 Sudovi	 u	 ovim	 državama	 preispitivali	 su	
sudske	presude	kojima	su	poništene	arbitražne	odluke	te	odlučili	kako	se	u	određenim	
okolnostima	može	 otkloniti	 učinkovitost	 takvih	 presuda	 i	 priznati	 odnosno	 izvršiti	
poništena	arbitražna	odluka	unatoč	odluke	o	poništenju	koju	 je	donio	nadležni	sud	
u	državi	sjedišta	arbitraže.	Iako	pristupi	sudova	u	SAD	i	Nizozemskoj	imaju	nekih	
sličnosti,	ipak	se	pravno	rezoniranje	sudova	u	ove	dvije	jurisdikcije	bitno	razlikuje.	
U	svojoj	odluci	iz	studenoga	2017.	Vrhovni	sud	Nizozemske	(pre)naglašava	iznimni	
karakter	okolnosti	koje	bi	opravdale	priznanje	i	izvršenje	poništene	arbitražne	odluke,	
tako	da	bi	se	na	prvi	pogled	mogao	steći	utisak	kako	je	ponešto	ublažena	razlika	ovoga	
pristupa	 sa	 pravnim	 rezoniranjem	 sudova	 u	 SAD.	 Međutim,	 detaljna	 analiza	 ova	
dva	pristupa	ukazuje	da	suštinske	razlike	ostaju.	U	članku	se	iznosi	kritika	općenito	
priznanja	ili	ovrhe	poništenih	arbitražnih	odluka.	Osobito	se	kritizira	različitost	pravnih	
pristupa	na	kojima	se	u	pojedinim	državama	temelji	priznaje	poništenih	arbitražnih	
odluka	 kada	 je	 priznanje	 jednostrano,	 tj.,	 ne	 temelji	 se	 na	 nekoj	 međunarodnoj	
konvenciji	kao	 što	 je	Europska	 (Ženevska)	konvencija	o	međunarodnoj	 trgovačkoj	
arbitraži	iz	1962.	U	članku	se	nadalje	sugerira	postavljanje	međunarodno	prihvaćenih	
standarda	u	 interesu	pravne	sigurnosti	 i	predvidivosti,	ukoliko	je	među	arbitražnim	
stručnjacima	prevladavajuće	mišljene	o	načelnoj	prihvatljivosti	priznanja	i	izvršenja	
poništenih	arbitražnih	odluka.	
Ključne riječi: poništenje arbitražnih odluka; priznanje i izvršenje 
arbitražnih odluka; priznanje i izvršenje inozemnih presuda; 
javni poredak; arbitraža; međunarodno procesno pravno. 
*	 Dr.	sc.	Vesna	Lazić-Smoljanić,	izvanredna	profesorica	Pravnog	fakulteta	u	Rijeci;	vlazicsmo@
pravri.hr. 
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Zussamenfassung
VOLLSTRECKUNG AUFGEHOBENER AUSLÄNDISCHER 
SCHIEDSSPRÜCHE: VERGLEICH ZWISCHEN DEN 
NIEDERLANDEN UND DEN USA
Diese	 Arbeit	 analysiert	 prozessrechtliche	 Aspekte	 der	 Anerkennung	 und	
Vollstreckung	 von	 Schiedssprüchen,	 welche	 im	 Land,	 nach	 dessen	 Recht	 sie	
ergangen	 sind,	 aufgehoben	wurden.	Die	Arbeit	 fokussiert	 sich	 auf	 die	 vor	 kurzem	
beschlossenen	 Fälle	 in	 den	 Niederlanden	 und	 den	 USA,	 an	 welche	 die	 Gerichte	
anders	als	die	 in	Frankreich	vor	einigen	Jahren	herangegangen	sind.	 In	Frankreich	
dürfen	die	Gerichte	bei	der	Anerkennung	aufgehobener	ausländischer	Schiedssprüche	
das	inländische	Recht	über	die	Anerkennung	und	Vollstreckung	der	Schiedssprüche	
anwenden.	 Französisches	 Recht	 bietet	 nämlich	 ein	 günstigeres	 Umfeld	 im	
Vergleich	 zu	 dem	 im	 Jahr	 1958	 erlassenen	New	Yorker	Übereinkommen	 über	 die	
Anerkennung	und	Vollstreckung	ausländischer	Schiedssprüche. Die	Gerichte	in	den	
USA	und	den	Niederlanden	haben	vor	kurzem	eine	andere	Vorgehensweise	bei	der	
Anerkennung	 und	Vollstreckung	 aufgehobener	 Schiedssprüche	 gewählt.	 Sie	 haben	
die	Rechtssprüche,	durch	welche	die	Schiedssprüche	aufgehoben	wurden,	überprüft,	
und	haben	beschlossen,	dass	man	unter	bestimmten	Umständen	den	aufgehobenen	
Schiedsspruch	 anerkennen	 kann. Obwohl	 die	 Gerichte	 in	 den	 USA	 und	 den	
Niederlanden	ähnliche	Vorgehensweisen	bei	ihren	Rechtssprüchen	ausgewählt	haben,	
gibt	es	trotzdem	wesentliche	Unterschiede	in	deren	Argumentationen. Aus	dem	im	Jahr	
2017	gefassten	Rechtsspruch	des	Obersten	Gerichtshofs	der	Niederlande	geht	hervor,	
dass	 die	Umstände,	welche	die	Anerkennung	und	Vollstreckung	des	 aufgehobenen	
Schiedsspruches	als	Ausnahme	anzusehen	sind,	so	dass	man	den	Eindruck	bekommen	
könnte,	 dass	 die	 Argumentationen	 dieser	 Gerichte	 ähnlich	 sind. Nähere	 Analyse	
zeigt	 aber,	 dass	 es	 wesentliche	 Unterschiede	 zwischen	 ihnen	 gibt.	 In	 der	 Arbeit	
wird	 die	 Anerkennung	 und	 Vollstreckung	 aufgehobener	 Schiedssprüche	 kritisiert.	
Insbesondere	kritisiert	man	unterschiedliche	Vorgehensweisen	für	die	Anerkennung	
aufgehobener	Schiedssprüche	in	einzelnen	Staaten,	wenn	die	Anerkennung	einseitig	
ist,	 beziehungsweise	 wenn	 sie	 sich	 auf	 keine	 völkerrechtliche	 Konventionen	
stützt,	 wie	 zum	 Beispiel	 auf	 der	 Europäischen	 Konvention	 über	 Internationale	
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit.	In	der	Arbeit	wird	vorgeschlagen,	dass	man	völkerrechtliche	
Standards	 in	 diesem	 Bereich	 festsetzen	 sollte,	 falls	 sowohl	Akademiker	 als	 auch	
Schiedsgerichtsexperte	die	Ansicht	vertreten,	dass	man	aufgehobene	Schiedssprüche	
anerkennen	und	vollstrecken	sollte.	
Schlüsselwörter: Aufhebung der Schiedssprüche, Anerkennung und 
Vollstreckung der Schiedssprüche, Anerkennung und 
Vollstreckung inländischer Rechtssprüche, Schiedsverfahren, 
völkerrechtliches Prozessrecht. 
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Riassunto
LE SENTENZE NEI CASI YUKOS E PEMEX: 
CONDIVIDONO LE CORTI NEI PAESI BASSI E NEGLI 
STATI UNITI D'AMERICA LO STESSO APPROCCIO 
CON RIGUARDO ALL’ESECUZIONE DELLE DECISIONI 
ARBITRALI ANNULLATE?
Nello	 scritto	 si	 analizzano	 gli	 aspetti	 processuali	 del	 riconoscimento	 e	
dell'esecuzione	 delle	 decisioni	 arbitrali	 che	 sono	 annullate	 nello	 stato	 dove	 sono	
state	 emesse.	 Il	 lavoro	 s'incentra	 sui	 casi	 recentemente	 risolti	 negli	 USA	 e	 nei	
Paesi	 Bassi,	 dove	 le	 corti	 hanno	 adottato	 impostazioni	 in	 parte	 diverse	 rispetto	
a	 quella	 della	 giurisprudenza	 in	 Francia	 diversi	 anni	 fa.	 Il	 ragionamento	 giuridico	
della	 giurisprudenza	 francese	 in	 occasione	 del	 riconoscimento	 delle	 decisioni	
arbitrali	 annullate	 si	basa	 sull’applicazione	del	diritto	 interno	 sul	 riconoscimento	e	
sull’esecuzione	delle	decisioni	arbitrali. Precisamente,	il	diritto	interno	francese	è	più	
conveniente	rispetto	al	regime	di	riconoscimento	in	forza	della	Convenzione	di	New	
York	 per	 il	 riconoscimento	 e	 l’esecuzione	 delle	 sentenze	 arbitrali	 del	 1958.	Negli	
USA	e	nei	Paesi	Bassi	 recentemente	 si	 sono	adottati	 approcci	diversi	 in	occasione	
del	riconoscimento	e	dell’esecuzione	delle	decisioni	annullate.	Le	corti	in	questi	stati	
hanno	 vagliato	 le	 sentenze	 giudiziali	 con	 le	 quali	 sono	 state	 annullate	 le	 sentenze	
arbitrali	e	hanno	deciso	che	in	determinate	circostanze	si	possa	rimuovere	l’efficacia	
di	tali	decisioni	e	riconoscere	ovvero	dare	esecuzione	alla	decisione	arbitrale	annullata	
a	 prescindere	 dalla	 decisione	 sull’annullamento	 che	 è	 stata	 emessa	 dal	 tribunale	
competente	nel	paese	sede	dell’arbitrato.	Benché	le	impostazioni	delle	corti	negli	USA	
e	 nei	 Paesi	 Bassi	 hanno	 alcune	 similitudini,	 nondimeno	 il	 ragionamento	 giuridico	
delle	 corti	 in	 queste	 due	 giurisdizioni	 si	 differenzia	 notevolmente.	 Nella	 propria	
decisione	del	 novembre	2017	 la	Corte	 suprema	dei	Paesi	Bassi	 evidenzia	 (troppo)	
il	carattere	eccezionale	delle	circostanze	che	giustificherebbero	 il	 riconoscimento	e	
l’esecuzione	della	decisione	arbitrale	annullata,	sì	che	di	primo	acchito	si	potrebbe	
avere	l’impressione	che	la	differenza	di	questo	approccio	rispetto	all’argomentazione	
giurisprudenziale	statunitense	non	sia	poi	così	netta.	Tuttavia,	un’analisi	dettagliata	
di	 queste	 due	 impostazioni	 dimostra	 l’esistenza	 di	 differenze	 di	 fondo.	Nel	 lavoro	
si	 espone	 una	 critica	 generale	 al	 riconoscimento	 ed	 all’esecuzione	 delle	 decisioni	
arbitrali	annullate.	In	particolare,	si	critica	la	diversità	di	impostazioni	giuridiche	sulle	
quali	 nei	 singoli	 stati	 si	 fonda	 il	 riconoscimento	 delle	 decisioni	 arbitrali	 annullate	
allorquando	il	 riconoscimento	è	unilaterale,	e	cioè	si	 fonda	su	di	una	Convenzione	
internazionale	come	la	Convenzione	europea	(di	Ginevra)	sull’arbitrato	commerciale	
internazionale	 del	 1962.	Nel	 lavoro,	 inoltre,	 si	 suggerisce	 la	 creazione	 di	 standard	
internazionali	riconosciuti	al	fine	di	garantire	la	certezza	del	diritto	e	la	prevedibilità,	
qualora	tra	gli	esperti	di	arbitrato	sia	invalso	il	parere	di	massima	sull’accettabilità	del	
riconoscimento	e	l’esecuzione	delle	decisioni	arbitrali	annullate.	
V. LAZIĆ-SMOLJANIĆ, Enforcing annulled arbitral awards: a comparison of...
Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, vol. 39, br. 1, 215-240 (2018)240
Parole chiave: annullamento delle decisioni arbitrali; riconoscimento 
ed esecuzione delle decisioni arbitrali; riconoscimento 
ed esecuzione delle sentenze straniere; ordine pubblico; 
arbitrato; diritto processuale internazionale. 
